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THE BIG ANTITRUST CASE IN THE TRIAL COURTS*
PHILIP MARCUSt
It is not uncommon for one generation to assume that its burdens
are greater than those of previous generations. The reaction of a num-
ber of trial and appellate judges in the last decade to the "big case" and
the "big record" would seem to indicate that they have made such an as-
sumption, or else that they are more restive under similar burdens. The
writer is in no position to determine whether prohibition era judges had
fewer burdens than those of the past two decades in which private anti-
trust cases, primarily in the motion picture field, have been unusually
numerous.' It is a phenomenon of recent years, however, that "bigness"
of antitrust cases has evoked as much, if not more, interest than the
"bigness" of members of an industry against whom an antitrust suit is
brought. In tis article we intend to explore at some length the means
and techniques available at the trial stage to expedite "big cases." It is
a major thesis of this paper that the courts, in their pursuit of expedition
in "big cases," should not endanger more important objectives commonly
associated with judicial proceedings.2
THE PROBLEM, REAL AND MYTHICAL-REACTION OF THE JUDICIARY
AND THE BAR
One of the less controversial statements in this article is that clogged
court calendars are a bar to justice. It is true that "big cases" play their
part in clogging the calendars of the courts,3 but they are only one of
* The views expressed are the personal views of the writer.
t Member of Staff, House Antitrust Subcommittee.
1. In 1951 there were over 100 antitrust cases pending against motion picture
companies. Hearings on H.R. 3408 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, pt. 3, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 111 (1951). Although antitrust litigation in
the motion picture industry has been customary, between 1946 and 1952 there was an
appreciable rise in the number of cases filed; probably as an aftermath of the Govern-
ment's success in its antitrust suit against the major motion picture companies. United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). The great majority of these
cases never reached trial, and there has been an appreciable decrease in the number of
such cases in recent years. Although more government antitrust cases have been filed in
the last 20 years than in any other similar period, the annual total is not large. See
Table C-8, Din. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CouRTs ANN. REI'.
2. Cf., Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE
L. REv. 1019, 1271 (1949); Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45-47
(1958).
3. See 1950 Dis. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTs ANN. REP. 69.
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several factors, many of more importance, which cause judicial backlogs."
Attempts to deal with the problem of the "big case" in the trial
courts culminated in a Report on Procedure in Anti-trust and Other Pro-
tracted Cases (hereinafter referred to as Report), adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States on September 16, 1951 ;' and in a
Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases
(hereinafter referred to as Handbook), adopted by the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States in March 1960.' In view of their importance
to the subject matter of this article, a brief review of the antecedents of
the Report and the Handbook might well precede discussion of their con-
tents.
The impetus to action by lawyers and the courts with respect to the
problem of the "big case" appears to have been imparted by a thoughtful
article by Judge Prettyman of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia which appeared in the September 1948 issue of
the American Bar Journal.' Since that time, there has been much litera-
ture about the problem of the "big case" in the trial courts! Judge
4. Other factors include the paucity of judges in certain districts in relation to
the number of cases filed (now being somewhat alleviated), poor administration of par-
ticular courts, major variations in the abilities of various judges, and age and health
handicaps of judges. See FIELD STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS OF U.S. COURTS, REP. TO
SEN. APPROPRIATIONS CommIs., at 10 (April 1959). It was apparently only after several
years of recommendations by the Attorney General that the Judicial Conference recom-
mended that all preliminary motions in a "big case" should be decided by the judge who
will hear the case. See REPORT, note 5 infra at 38. For many years after the REPORT
there continued to be considerable variation on the part of federal district courts in
observing this recommendation. The Southern District of New York was a backslider
in this respect until quite recently. See Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases
for United States Circuit and District Judges held at New York University Law Center,
N.Y. City, Aug. 26-30, 1957 (hereinafter cited as 1957 Seminar), 21 F.R.D. 395, 420
(1958) ; Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges held
at the School of Law, Stanford Univ., Stanford, Calif., Aug. 25-30, 1958 (hereinafter
cited as 1958 Seminar), 23 F.R.D. 319, 577 (1959) ; Special Committee Report,
Streamlining the Big Case, 13 A.B.A. SEcr. ANTITRUST L. 183, 186 ff. (1958).
5. Printed in booklet form and distributed by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, upon authorization of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
U.S. Gov. Print. Off., 1955 0-325919, the Report (often called the Prettyman Report)
is hereinafter cited as REPORT. The full text of the REPORT is reported in 13 F.R.D. 62
(1953).
6. Printed in pamphlet form by West Publishing Co., the Handbook is hereinafter
cited as HANDBOOK. The full text of the HANDBOOK is reproduced in 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
For a discussion of the facilitation of introduction of evidence before the Restrictive
Practices Court in England, see Korah, The Restrictive Practices Court, 12 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEmS 76, 79 ff. (1959).
7. Prettyman, Needed: New Trial Technique: Suggestions for the Trial of Compli-
cated Cases, 34 A.B.A.J. 766 (1948).
8. See McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation,
64 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1950) ; Whitney, The Trial of an Anti-Trust Case, 5 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 449 (1950); Handler, Anti-Trust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities,
6 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 59 ff. (1951) ; Yankwich, Observations in Anti-Trust Pro-
cedures, 10 F.R.D. 165 (1951) ; Gesell, Procedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted
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Prettyman's article contained only a passing reference to antitrust cases,
but much of the subsequent literature has been the product of attorneys
associated with law firms which commonly represent big defendants in
antitrust litigation. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that such
articles center around antitrust cases.' Judicial complaint about anti-
trust cases has also, at times, been quite forceful."0
The Report was authored by a committee of ten judges appointed in
December, 1949" to examine the procedure governing the trial of "big
cases." The Committee considered the matter at some length. It con-
ferred with representatives of the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice as well as with practitioners who commonly represented "big"
defendants in antitrust cases. A tentative draft of their findings was
circulated among the more experienced trial attorneys in the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice, as well as among other antitrust
lawyers and judges. The Committee, whose report was adopted by the
Judicial Conference, was not a continuing one, but it did encourage ad-
ditional suggestions as to procedure in "big cases."' 2  The Report was
widely distributed among courts and lawyers. 3 Despite the fanfare with
which it was announced, its use was not noteworthy. 4 It furnished,
however, the impetus for the publication in 1954 of the influential Report
Cases, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1085 (1952); Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13
F.R.D. 41 (1953); Ryan, A Judicial Solution to the Procedural Problems of the So-
Called Big Case, 41 GEo. L. J. 182 (1953). Cf. Dession, The Trial of Economic and
Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L. J. 1019 (1949); Nitschke, Procedure in
Antitrust Investigations [1950 Winter] U. ILL. L. F. 593; Cahill, Some Recent Trends
and Developments in. the Anti-Trust Law, 1 REcom OF N.Y.C.B.A. 201 (1946).
9. See McAllister, The Judicial Conference Report on the "Big Case": Procedural
Problems of Protracted Litigation, 38 A.B.A.J. 289 (1952); Whitney, supra note 8;
Gesell, supra note 8. In the last mentioned article the author suggests as a solution
to the "big case" problem that fewer antitrust cases be tried. See also 1957 Seminar,
21 F.R.D. 395, 427 (1958). For a view that the HAND0OK rules may have an adverse
effect on plaintiffs and their attorneys, see Letter, 47 A.B.A.J. 847 (1961). In every
antitrust case with which this writer has been associated, it has been the Government
which has initiated procedures designed to expedite such cases.
10. See remarks of the Chief Justice of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, [1952] C.C.H. ANTITRUST LAW Sym'osium 15. See
also 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 490-91 (1958).
11. Prettyman, Stone, Magruder, Augustus N. Hand, Lindley, Chestnut, Kloeb,
Leahy, Leibel (who took the place of former Judge Rifkin), and Yankwich.
12. See 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 538 (1958).
13. See 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 387 (1959). The Conference desired that
publicity be given the REPORT through the media of bar journals and law school publica-
tions. See REPORT, p. 40. The comments that have been made, even when perfunctory,
undoubtedly have ensured a wide acquaintance with the existence of the REPORT. See
McAllister, The Judicial Conference Report on the "Big Case": Procedural Problems
of Protracted Litigations, 38 A.B.A.J. 289 (1952) ; Gesell, Procedure in Antitrust and
Other Protracted Cases, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1085 (1952) ; Book Reviews: Loos, 20 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 366 (1952); Seidel, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 133 (1952); 20 J. OF KAN. BAR
Ass'N 271 (1952).
14. See 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 387 (1959).
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by the Committee on Practice and Procedure in the Trial of Antitrust
Cases of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association
(hereinafter referred to as the 1954 A.B.A. Report)." A series of re-
ported seminars in which pretrial procedure was emphasized also re-
sulted in considerable attention being paid to the Report."
The Handbook was the work of a panel of district judges appointed
in 1956 to make a study of special problems in the pretrial of long and
complicated cases. The Report was their starting point of reference."
This study group" worked closely with the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association. The writer believes the resulting Handbook
owes its improvement over the Report to the assistance of that Section.
He also feels that some of its more dubious provisions may have been
influenced by the fact that the Section is heavily weighted with members
of the bar who comomnly appear as counsel for defendants in antitrust
suits."9 The title of the Report made the "big case" practically synony-
mous with antitrust cases.2" The Handbook is more perceptive in this
regard, but the emphasis in both is on antitrust cases. 2 The problem of
the big antitrust case does exist, but the writer believes it has been much
exaggerated.22 In actuality, if "big cases" are considered as such when
15. The report [hereinafter cited as 1954 A.B.A. REPORT], due to its length, was
not printed in the 1954 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L., but was printed separately by the
A.B.A.
16. See 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 401 (1958) ; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1959).
17. Id. at 388.
18. Judges Albert Bryan, Henry N. Graven, Gilbert H. Jertberg, Seybourn H.
Lynne, Joseph C. McGarraghey, Alfred P. Murrah, Frank A. Picard, Royce H. Savage,
William F. Smith, William E. Steckler, and Charles E. Wyzanski.
19. The HANDBOOK makes frequent references to reports of the Antitrust Section
of the American Bar Association.
20. This supposed synonymity has been promoted by others. See 1958 Seminar,
23 F.R.D. 319 (1959).
21. But both the REPORT and the HANDBOOK recognized: (1) that not all antitrust
cases are "big"; (2) that other types of suits may be "big" cases.
22. See Baldridge, Simplifying and Expediting Cases, [1951] C.C.H. SYmiposIull
ON BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWs 23. A study of the records
in seven antitrust cases in the 1950 term of the Supreme Court reveals that one exceeded
9,000 pages, one was in excess of 5,000 pages, two were over 2,000 pages, and three
were under 500 pages. The record of one non-antitrust case that term exceeded 9,000
pages. In the 1951 term there were seven antitrust cases before the Court, and two
others in which the antitrust laws were an element. Of the seven, one had a printed
record of about 7,000 pages, but three had a record of less than 300 pages. There were
several non-antitrust cases with records of large size. In the 1958 term, the antitrust
case with the largest record, 860 pages, was surpassed in this respect by two non-antitrust
cases. There were four antitrust cases argued that term.
From January 1, 1946 through June 10, 1953, 317 cases were brought by the United
States under the Sherman Act, of which 60 were tried on the merits; and in only 20 of
these did the trial last more than a month. Address by Chief of the General Litigation
Section of the Antitrust Division on Some Procedural Problems in Protracted Antitrnst
Trials, 1953 Institute Federal Antitrust Laws, University of Michigan, June 19, 1953.
And see statistics compiled by Yankwich, Observations on, Antitrust Procedures, 10 F.R.D.
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the trial extends beyond several weeks or the record dips into thousands
of pages, many antitrust cases are not "big cases."2  Of course a big
antitrust case may be big indeed. The Report refers to ten antitrust cases
tried over the prior twelve years in which the exhibits ran into thousands
and the record into many more pages.24 One of these, United States v.
Aluminum Company of Amnerica,c lasted over two years with minor in-
terruptions.26 The writer does not, however, classify United States v.
Morgan"2 7 as a typical big antitrust case. Its inflated transcript reflects
165, 167-68, 171-79 (1950). Judge Yankwich's information as to United States v.
Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), however, is not correct. Plaintiffs
case took about ten and one-half court days and defendants' case took about twelve and
one-half court days. These times included opening statements and arguments at the
end of plaintiff's case. During the recess between the plaintiff's and the defendant's
cases, the presiding judge held court in another part of the state.
From January 1, 1935 until January 1, 1950, only 85 government antitrust cases out
of 600 filed were actually tried. See Yanklwich, supra at 166. In the past 20 years, about
three out of four government civil antitrust cases have been terminated without trial.
See REPORT OF STAFF OF ANTITRUST SuBcom., HoUsE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., IST SESS., CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM (Comm. Print. 1959). The total of
antitrust cases tried, whether private or government, is small compared with the number
of antitrust cases filed. See Freund, The Pleadings and Pre-Trial of an Antitrust Claim,
46 CORNELL L. Q. 555 (1961).
In the 1950 Dig. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP., reference
is made to nine cases in the federal district courts which lasted thirty days or more.
Only one of the nine was an antitrust case, and five of the nine had more trial days than
that one. For the years 1946-1948, it has been estimated that the median length of trial
time for both government and private antitrust cases was five days. The average for
1947-1949, however, was considerably higher. 1950 REPORT, supra at 96-98, 114. In fiscal
1954, out of 119 cases tried for ten days or more, two were government antitrust cases
and eight were private antitrust cases. In that year, 34 antitrust cases were filed. 1954
Dix. OF THE AD IN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 190-91. In fiscal 1957, out
of 192 cases tried for ten or more days, fifteen were antitrust cases, one of which was a
government suit. 1957 Din. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 99,
204. In fiscal 1958, out of 31 antitrust cases, thirteen took ten or more days. 1958
Din. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 190-91. In 1959, out of ten
government antitrust cases tried, only two took over nineteen days. 1958 Seminar, 23
F.R.D. 319, 426 (1959).
For the years 1954 through 1958, 52 out of 152 antitrust cases tried in the federal
courts took ten days or more for trial. During that same period approximately 943 cases
tried in the federal courts consumed ten or more days in trial. Table C-8, 1954-1958
DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. Of all government antitrust
cases tried from 1954 through 1957, only five lasted more than twenty days. 1957 Seminar,
21 F.R.D. 395, 419, 483 (1958) ; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 551 ff. (1959). A judge's
discussion of protracted criminal cases did not include a reference to any antitrust case.
23. See note 22 supra.
24. ]EPORT, p. 3.
25. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
26. Cahill, Some Recent Trends and Developments in the Anti-Trust Laws, 1
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 201, 204 (1946). There might be added American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), with approximately 1,300 exhibits and almost
20,000 pages of printed record; United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 326
(1952), with about 2,500 exhibits and over 7,000 pages of record; and United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) with over 3,700 exhibits
and a 5,200 page stenographic record.
27. 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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the predilection of the court to extract every particle of argument and
fact.
Many of the recommendations contained in the Report and the
Handbook had been used to some extent in big antitrust cases prior to
publication of the Report, but there had been no coordination of practice
in such cases by counsel or judges. The great virtue of the Report and
the Handbook is that, by their prestige, they may serve as authoritative
practice hornbooks for judges and practicing attorneys. The Report and
the Handbook have encouraged the use of "short cut" devices.2" Less
may be said for the general approach of the Report and the Handbook
and for some of their recommendations.
The emphasis of the Report was on rigidity in procedural steps
which increases the difficulty of prosecuting antitrust cases. Such rigid-
ity would multiply the obligations of counsel, particularly those of coun-
sel for the plaintiff.2" The philosophy of the Report, seemingly against
many recent trends, was opposed to the pronounced trend toward relax-
ing strict exclusionary rules of evidence in antitrust cases.3" Its philoso-
phy made it difficult to effectuate the growing recognition of the im-
portance of establishing the grounds for the terms of a judgment as well
as proving a violation of the antitrust laws."'
The Handbook, admirable in many respects, contains a number of
caveats, but its approach is much the same as that of the Report. Both
assume a level of judicial competence, impartiality, patience, and firm-
ness without arbitrariness which a number of judges do not maintain.
In the hands of the latter, some of these rules and recommendations are
28. See 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 443 (1958).
29. A letter from H. E. Morison, the head of the Antitrust Division, to Judge
Prettyman, February 18, 1952, expressed general approval of the REPORT and assured
the cooperation of Antitrust Division lawyers. However, its several interpretations and
qualifications suggest some internal misgivings. In a subsequent letter of June 4, 1952 to
Judge Prettyman, the head of the Antitrust Division said, "I feel that the recommenda-
tions of the Conference in these and other matters can do much to further the expeditious
and efficient handling of antitrust cases provided they are not applied in such a manner
as to preclude the plaintiff from proving the facts essential to establish his case." 1957
Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 547 (1958).
30. E.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 10 F.R.D. 618 (D. Del.
1950) ; United States v. Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950);
Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L. 3. 1019,
1243 ff. (1948) ; Note, 46 ILL. L. REv. 915 (1952) ; Marcus, The Supreme Court and the
Antitrust Laws, 1947-1948, 37 GEo. L. J. 341, 366 ff. (1948). See also note 145 infra.
31. See Handler, Anti-Trust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities, 6 REcoRD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 59, 68-69 (1952) ; Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust Judgments
Through Hartford-Enpire, 34 GEo. L. J. 1, 36 ff. (1945) ; Note, 97 U. oF PA. L. REv.
234 (1948).
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likely to become very oppressive," particularly to the extent that a rule
or recommendation bears more heavily upon one side than upon the other.
The antitrust laws represent one of the basic thrusts of economic
policy in the American scene. Congressional policy has seen fit to pro-
vide for appeals directly to the Supreme Court in government civil anti-
trust cases," to provide for special expediting courts in the more im-
portant government antitrust cases, 4 and to facilitate the use of private
antitrust suits in enforcing the Sherman Act by making available judg-
ments secured in govermnent antitrust suits as prima facie evidence in
private suits.3" Congress has expressly directed that the taking of depo-
sitions in antitrust cases be open to the public.3" The courts have allowed
the validity of patents to be attacked when invalidity would vitiate a de-
fense to charges of antitrust violations, even though traditional rules of
estoppel would normally prevent such attack."7 It would seem, therefore,
that a proper test to apply to proposed recommendations or rules for the
trial of an antitrust case would be: Do they facilitate the enforcement of
the antitrust laws without unfairness or, alternatively, do they expedite
the disposition of an antitrust case without unfairness and without im-
peding or endangering the enforcement of the antitrust laws ?"
The policy considerations relating to effective enforcement receive
32. All practicing attorneys have their judge-made chamber of horrors. The
Antitrust Bar is no exception. In this writer's book of memories there are a number
of such horror stories-some personal, some a matter of record, some told him by
members of the bar or judges. For a difference in attitude of judges, see 1958 Seminar,
23 F.R.D. 319, 420, 435 (1959); Tolman, The Administration of the Federal Courts:
A Review of Progress During 595o-5951, 38 A.B.A.J. 127 (1952); Hadley, Bias and
Prejudice or the Case of the Seven; Bishops, 32 B.U.L. REv. 265 (1952); Medina,
Judicial Administration and the Law Schools, 40 Ky. L. REv. 359, 362 (1952); [Sept.
1952] Rep. of the Standing Comm. on Fed. Judiciary, A.B.A. Advance Prog. 32 ff; Marx,
Justice is Expensive, 36 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 75 (1952) ; Cedarquist, The Need for Judicial
Reform in Illinois, 2 DEPAuL L. RFv. 39 (1952). Cf., Spector v. United States, 193
F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1952).
The Judicial Conference acknowledged the strong feeling on the part of the Depart-
ment of Justice representatives that firmness of limitation was exercised against it and
not against private parties and at the same time acknowledged strong protests of the
opposite sort from private parties. REPORT, p. 7.
33. 62 Stat 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. 29 (1958) ; 28 U.S.C. 1253 (1958).
34. 63 Stat 107 (1949); 15 U.S.C. 28 (1958).
35. 69 Stat. 283 (1955); 15 U.S.C. 16 (1958).
36. 37 Stat. 731 (1913); 15 U.S.C. 30 (1958).
37. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Edward
Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947); MacGregor v.
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947).
38. An attorney who has been prominent both in government service and as counsel
for antitrust defendants, after adducing how complex a big antitrust case may become,
has said: "In fairness to the Government, it should be pointed out that the framing of
the scope of cases properly lies within its sound discretion and that it is not wise to
fetter this discretion by rule or otherwise." Cahill, Some Recent Trends and Develop-
mierts in the Antitrust Laws, 1 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 201, 204 (1946).
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no acknowledgment in the Report or in the Handbook of the Judicial Con-
ference. The recommendations in the Report and the Handbook are
likely to be interpreted according to their tone. In view of their wide
distribution, the absence of an expression of concern in them for the
achievement of a just and proper result in a particular case leaves much
to be desired.39
Before embarking upon an analysis of the recommendations in the
Report and the Handbook, it is well to emphasize that criticism by the
writer is often directed not to the device suggested, but to the recom-
mended rigidity of its use.
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
Much of the subsequent emphasis that developed from the Report
was with respect to pretrial proceedings,4" an emphasis which this
writer believes is justified. Such emphasis, however, lends itself to
abuse when used to sacrifice substance to procedure or the needs of
39. Thus, in the Investment Banking case, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), in discussing a proposed modification of a pretrial order sought
by the Government, defendants' counsel sought to prevent the change to the marked
detriment of the Government, by reference to the REPORT of the Judicial Conference.
Record, p. 5507, 5519, United States v. Morgan, supra. For an example of rigidity by a
lower court which promoted expediency at the expense of justice, see Russell-Milling
Co. v. Todd, 198 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1952), where the court had to reverse a holding
by a master and district court in which a plaintiff had been considered bound by a
stipulation of facts which was entered into by plaintiff's counsel by mistake, the mistake
apparently being known by defendant's counsel. See also Fernandez v. United Fruit Co.,
200 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 935 (1952); Olsen v. Shinnihon
Kisen, K.K., 25 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. Penn. 1960). Also see note 72 infra.
In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 10 F.R.D. 618 (D. Del. 1950),
it appeared that pursuant to a pretrial order, the Government filed with the Clerk of the
Court copies of documents on which it intended to rely, arranged and marked as exhibits
in accordance with its proposed order of proof. The Government stated it was continuing
its investigation and that additional documents might be offered. The defendants moved
to strike all the exhibits or to compel plaintiff to file a list of exhibits not on the list.
In denying this motion, the court said at 622:
Admittedly, the purpose of adopting pretrial procedural techniques in connection
with the introduction of mass documentary proofs in antitrust cases is not only
laudable but necessary in view of the gargantuan dimensions current antitrust
litigation is assuming. In reducing the time element of trial and crystallizing
supporting proofs for the trial judge's consideration, careful attention, however,
must be given that innovations in this field should not be designed to deprive
government counsel-or defense counsel-of the right within reasonable bounds,
to control the preparation and presentation of their respective cases.
This approach is to be contrasted with that taken by Judge Wyzanski in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 93 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1950), where, in addition
to excluding numerous exhibits at one stage, he also required the Government to select the
300 documents considered by them to be the most important. It is worth noting that
counsel in the Investment Banking case, supra, and United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., supra, who sought a strict rule of limitation upon the Government's
presentation of its case, were among the authors referred to in note 9 supra.
40. E.g., Kaufman, Report on Study of the Protracted Case, 21 F.R.D. 55 (1957);
1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1958) ; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1959).
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a particular case to an inapt uniformity of procedure.4 The Hand-
book, particularly in its Appendix, presents a set of guides for pretrial
proceedings which, except in a few instances, promotes-if its spirit as
well as its letter is followed-a high degree of utility for pretrial pro-
ceedings without endangering a just determination of the cause.
Judges differ as to whether a reporter should record pretrial pro-
ceedings." -  The Handbook recommends that the initial pretrial confer-
ence be without the presence of a reporter. 3 This writer prefers to have
one present. A transcript avoids differences between counsel as to what
took place at such hearings, and may be important with respect to matters
which come up later-before the trial, at the trial, or on appeal. The
appropriate use of an "off the record" discussion is available when de-
sirable.
ANALYSIS OF THE EXPEDITING DEVICES RECOiMENDED IN THE
REPORT AND HANDBOOK 44
Identification of the Big Case. The Handbook contains a valuable
discussion on identification of the "big" case, and antitrust suits are
singled out for special attention. It is hoped that its caveats will receive
the attention they deserve.4"
Necessity of Complete Preparation. The Report asserts the neces-
sity of complete preparation on the part of all participants. It points out
that a task of the trial judge in a "big case" is to make certain, before
setting the case for trial, that counsel are completely prepared and have
efficiently organized their material. There is much to be said for this
41. See McDowell, Pretrial Procedures: Pretrial v. Procedure, IV ANTITRUST
BULL. 675 (Sept.-Oct. 1959). And see 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 559 (1958). Local
pretrial rules, lacking uniformity, are sometimes quite inappropriate for a protracted
antitrust case. In an antitrust case in the Western District of Pennsylvania several
years ago, counsel for the Government and New York counsel for the defendant were
in agreement as to the handling of documents and other matters. Local counsel for the
defendant, however, pointed out that the procedure agreed upon was inconsistent with
the local pretrial rule. Considerable argument took place before the court before a
pretrial order adopting the proposed procedure was entered.
In some courts, an initial formal pretrial notice requires certain things to be
done by the parties prior to the pretrial conference. Antitrust counsel might shudder
at one provision in such notice from the middle District of Alabama: "Attorneys to be
fully prepared to state the facts of the case in the most minute detail and to admit all
the facts that are true." Cf., Seminar on Practice and Procedure Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 37, 141-42, 171-72 (1961). The HAND300K should
have the effect of promoting more uniformity in this respect. See notes 65 and 211 infra.
42. See Seminar, 20 F.R.D. 485, 526 ff. (1958); 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319,
596 (1959). Cf., 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 411-12, 494-95 (1958).
43. HANDBOOK, p. 21.
44. Although the writer will comment on many of the recommendations in the
REPORT and the HANDBOOK, no attempt will be made to analyze all of them.
45. But cf., Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 12 F.R.D. 516
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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approach, although it is hardly consistent with the Report's leanings to-
ward curbing discovery proceedings. The same approach might well be
taken as to cases which have been set for trial. In either event, dilatory
tactics should not be rewarded by postponement of the trial date if the
other side is ready.
Statement of Issues and Discovery. Antitrust complaints more of-
ten suffer from too much rather than from too little verbiage. For a
while a number of judges in the District Court for the Southern District
of New York applied a strict rule of pleading to complaints in private
antitrust cases requiring them to meet higher standards than in other
cases. This trend was halted to some extent by an opinion ' of Judge
Clark, speaking for the Court of Appeals for that circuit, but harmony
on this point still seems to be lacking."
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and private
antitrust plaintiffs are often seriously hampered by not having subpoena
or discovery powers prior to the filing of a suit. They are not even
available on application to the courts.4" A troublesome problem is the
extent to which grand jury proceedings should and can be used to pro-
cure evidence for the purposes of filing civil antitrust suits.4" Under
the present state of the law it would seem that if grand jury proceedings
were instituted with the intent to bring criminal proceedings, if the evi-
dence so warranted, a civil suit brought by the Government would not
suffer the penalty of being under a disability therefor; but, if there were
not such genuine intent, disability might attach to the civil suit.5" And even
if a criminal suit is brought after grand jury proceedings, in a later civil
suit, private antitrust plaintiffs may be denied the benefit of such grand
jury discovery.5 A request to a prospective defendant to examine its
files may result in complete cooperation. On the other hand, it may re-
sult in a flat refusal; or in permission to examine certain files, but not
46. Nagler v. Admiral Corp. 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
47. See Freund, The Pleading and Pre-Trial of an Antitrust Claint, 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 555, 556-58 (1961); Padorani v. Bruckhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 551 (2d Cir. 1961).
48. One antitrust defendant's counsel's understanding of the problems of a plain-
tiff in preparing an antitrust case has led to the somewhat exaggerated statement:
"The only real preparation of a case can arise after the complaint is filed." Hearings
on H.R. 3408 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, pt. 3,
82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1951). See Baldridge, Simplifying and Expediting Cases,[1951] C.C.H. SYmPOSIUm ON BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 27.
49. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958); In re Grand
Jury Investigation of the Aviation Insurance Industry, 1960 Trade Cas. 1 76723
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
50. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960).
51. Application of State of California to Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas (E.D. Pa.
M-2261, Decision of May 11, 1961), now on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
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others; or, a reply may be received from a prominent law firm that it
represents the company whose files the Government desires to search and
that it will be glad to review the files and select documents in which it
believes the Government will be interested. In one instance in recent
years, the government investigators by accident found relevant docu-
ments in trash cans in the back alley of the company being investigated.
All this is discovery in reverse.
The writer is not aware of the filing of a government antitrust suit
where there was not sufficient knowledge of facts to warrant an honest
belief that a violation of the Sherman Act existed. In a number of cases,
however, the scope of issues and many of the probative facts became
known to the plaintiff only some time after the filing of the complaint.
The Report takes the position that, no matter what the objection or
difficulty, specification of issues should be required after the filing of the
complaint. Such particularization is to be achieved by informal con-
ferences between judge and counsel well in advance of a possible trial
date. These issues are to be incorporated in an order of the court which
should control proceedings thereafter as Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides. The Report admits that it sometimes hap-
pens that issues cannot formally and finally be fixed prior to processes of
discovery. However, it asserts that conferences as to issues should be
had prior to the beginning of discovery proceedings; the issues indicated
or known at that point should be framed and stated, and they should
serve as the basis for the bounds of permissible discovery.52
Elsewhere in the Report,3 it is stated that discovery process must
necessarily be held to the scope of the judge's program for the case as
developed by him in conference with counsel." The Report apparently
is primarily concerned with issues of fact rather than issues of law. 5 The
52. See 1958 Semnar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 393, 407, 416 (1959).
53. REPORT, p. 37-38.
54. In the face of this position, it is difficult to ascertain what vitality is left to
the statement, "The Rules of Civil Procedure relating to discovery are, of course, to be
given the widest meaning and effect, and the processes of discovery there provided
are in the nature of an investigation." REPoRT, p. 9. It has been said that the REPORT
puts discovery in a new position in the "big case." "The processes of discovery will be
used only if the trial judge is convinced that they will serve a useful and proper purpose
in the enterprise." McAllister, The Judicial Conference Report on the "Big Case":
Procedural Problems of Protracted Litigation, 38 A.B.A.J. 289, 291 (1952). This also
seems to have been the approach of the 1954 A.B.A. REPORT at 22-23. Cf., Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 106 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del. 1952). There has been some
retreat from this extreme position, but the retreat has not gone very far. See 13 A.B.A.
SECT. ANTITRUST REPORT 191 ff. (1958).
55. It has been said that the REPoRT, "would have complaints in antitrust cases
allege facts upon which the violation charged is based and the trial proceed on those
issues alone." Book Review, Loos, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 366 (1952). It may be
doubted that the REPORT goes so far but it would be difficult to argue that such analysis
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emphasis is not, however, on having an antitrust case decided on issues
which the evidence supports or on facts which should be available to the
court at the trial through voluntary or involuntary discovery, but on limit-
ing the issues and facts which might be available." Thus, if the com-
plaint charges violations respecting patents in a certain field, and at the
time of pretrial conference the Government counsel in the absence of
discovery confesses that his knowledge is limited to restrictions as to two
fabrics, the Government and the public may be deprived of an oppor-
tunity of removing restrictions of these same patents on other fabrics
which discovery might show were subject to similar restraints. It is no
answer to suggest an entirely new investigation and a new suit." The
Handbook is much less dogmatic on this score, but its reference to re-
has no support in the REPORT. Cf., Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 12 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
56. This emphasis has been interpreted by one writer, associated with a law firm
commonly appearing for antitrust defendants, as meaning that the court should be iron-
hearted toward the plaintiff, and the issues frozen in a pretrial order. Discovery by
defendants against plaintiffs to achieve this deep freeze is advocated at the same time
that limitations on the use of discovery by plaintiffs against defendants is praised.
McAllister, The Judicial Conference Report on the "Big Case": Procedural Problems of
Protracted Litigation, 38 A.B.A.J. 289, 290-91 (1952). That defendants, in supporting
rigidity, are less concerned with expedition than with hampering plaintiffs may be sur-
mised. In the dn Pont case, 10 F.R.D. 618 (D. Del. 1950), although the original pretrial
order stated plaintiff would not challenge the validity of the defendants' patents in its
case in chief, reserving the right to do so on rebuttal if the defense should rely upon
patent rights, the order directed the plaintiff to furnish to defendants' counsel a list of
defendants' patents, the validity of which plaintiff challenged, with a list of the prior art
relied upon. It took several applications before another judge (who tried the case) for
the Government to be relieved from this onerous, time-consuming requirement. As the
case developd at the trial, the validity of patents did not become an issue.
The attitude of a federal judge in the third circuit was expressed as follows: "And
finally, it is asking too much to expect a complete clarification of the issues in a compli-
cated case from one or even two pretrial conferences, perhaps held under the pressure
of time. The pretrial conference has its value, but it should be combined and integrated
with discovery procedure as a part of a single mechanism." Symposium on the Use of
Depositions and Discovery Under the Federal Rules, 12 F.R.D. 131, 164 (1952). This
is to be compared with the attitude of a justice of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia: "It is to say that the investigatory process is not part of the judicial
function, except insofar as a grand jury is considered part of the judicial function."
Baldridge, Simplifying and Expediting Cases, [1951] C.C.H. SYmPosiUm ON BusINEss
PRAcTIcES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 37.
57. See note 72 infra. In United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., Civil No. 14469, W.D. Pa., 1958, emphasis upon an early fixation
of issues and the desire of the court to limit the issues led to truncated discovery pro-
ceedings, a long pretrial record of controversy inviting appeal, and the preclusion of
discovery of data which should have been elicited for the proper determination of the
probable effect of the merger. The importance of those issues had become apparent to
the Government only after the start of discovery proceedings through documents un-
covered in defendant's files. This took place at a time when counsel for the defendant
considered those issues within the complaint. A change of defendant's counsel brought
a different point of view. This case was settled by a consent judgment. For an interesting
case of the uncovering of a new issue through discovery, see Nycoseal, Inc. v. Parke
Davis & Co., 28 F.R.D. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Frost, The Ascertainment
of Truth by Discovery (Seminar on Practice and Procedure) 28 F.R.D. 89, 96 (1961).
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strictive statements from several sources, including the Report, seems
to give support to any position a district court judge might take.58 More-
over, the Handbook, like the Report, treats delimitation of the issues in
the context of discovery proceedings.
It may be that the writers of the Report were unduly influenced by
the frontal attack by defense attorneys upon the use of discovery pro-
ceedings by plaintiffs in antitrust cases."r It can hardly be gainsaid that
in a number of government cases discovery proceedings have played a
large part in putting them in the "won" column. It is also true that the
trial of some of the government's antitrust cases have been greatly
shortened by discovery proceedings." These considerations might not
appeal to defendants. They should appeal to the public. The consensus
of informed opinion favors the liberal use of discovery proceedings to
bring both issues and facts into focus for examination by the courts."'
They were designed to supplement pleadings where knowledge was in-
complete as well as to facilitate trial on the merits of the relevant facts.
It would be regrettable if the Report were to establish a contrary trend
in "big cases" where discovery proceedings are so often of great im-
portance.
The Handbook is no less restrictive on the plaintiff with respect to
58. See HANDBOOK, pp. 22 ff.
59. E.g., A Symposium on the Use of Depositions and Discovery Under the Federal
Rules, 12 F.R.D. 131, 140, 142-45 (1952) ; McAllister, supra note 56; see Kaufman, Report
on Study of the Protracted Case, 21 F.R.D. 55, 62-64 (1958).
A study of the use of discovery in the federal courts has been said to reveal that
antitrust cases do not bulk large enough in number to show up in such a study.
Symposium, supra at 134.
60. Cf., Symposium, supra note 59 at 135. In United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1947), the use of discovery procedure enabled the Government to put
in its case in .three days. Abuse of discovery proceedings is more likely to be indulged
in by defendants than by plaintiffs. See Symposium, stpra note 59 at 132-40. The study
therein shows that depositions were probably used more often by defendants than by
plaintiffs, and this has been the writer's experience in antitrust cases. The extensive
use of depositions at the demand of defendants in a previous case was advanced by the
Government as a cause for its delay in bringing the Ford case to trial. Government
Brief in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948).
61. See Symposium on the Use of Depositions and Discovery Under the Federal
Rules, 12 F.R.D. 131, (Speck) 132 ff., (Willis) 160 ff., (Bard) 152 ff.: "Pre-Trials
are valueless unless there has been liberal use of discovery, or unless there has been a
free voluntary exchange of information which is frequently given now because of the
discovery provisions in the federal rules. . . . Discovery has aided counsel on both
sides in giving a clearer presentation of the facts to the jury at the trial. Discovery has
been a material factor in producing just results in law suits." Symposium, supra at 153.
See also 1950 Dmn. OF THE ADnx. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS AN. REP. 73. A poll of
antitrust lawyers in 1957 on the question, "Would you favor postponing discovery until
the issues have been clarified at pretrial"?, evoked a two to one negative response.
1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 496 (1958). In some district courts, pretrial rules prescribe
completion of all discovery before pretrial. See Seminar, 28 F.R.D. 37, 140 (1961).
As to some of the problems involved in discovery proceedings, see Freund, supra, note
47 at 561 ff.
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discovery.62 The Handbook acknowledges that frequently private plain-
tiffs and the Government are not sufficiently aware of the facts to per-
mit precise definition of issues prior to discovery of defendant. Never-
theless, there is to be filed a tentative statement of issues and, after an
interval, discussion is to be had at a pretrial conference for limiting
discovery.63
Discovery is to be stayed pending a pretrial conference hearing.
Discovery is to be confined to the genuine issues necessary to a decision
of the case. If preliminary discovery is required to enable parties to dis-
cuss definitions of issues, such discovery is to be specifically programmed.
Discovery is to be in accordance with the bounds established in tentative
statements of issues to be filed from time to time. As such discovery
progresses, the tentative statements of issues may be modified and dis-
covery sought in accordance with the modified statement. The filing of
a statement of issues is to be followed, after an interval of time has
elapsed, by a pretrial conference to consider limitation of discovery.
"This is not to suggest that the efforts of the trial judge should be
directed entirely to cutting down on discovery."64  In view of the ap-
proach evidenced by the above statements, there is a touch of incongruity
to find tucked away in an introductory part of the Handbook the state-
ment that "parties in a protracted case should have no lesser rights in
this respect [broad discovery] than those in less complex cases.""6
To the writer it seems clear that under the current approach to dis-
covery, the parties to big cases are denied the full benefit of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery. That such rules were designed
to be liberally construed so as to elicit the facts upon which a just result
might be obtained, and to eliminate "trials by surprise," is universally
recognized. It is one thing to encourage resort to the courts to prevent
abuse of the discovery rules. It is quite another thing to encourage the
courts to prevent one from having the full benefit of the rules by re-
stricting their use. It is also believed that piecemeal discovery is likely
to be more dilatory than discovery under the Federal Rules. The possi-
bility of more paper work, more conferences, and more out of town trips
is a very real one. It invites objections by counsel for defendants who
gladly receive the guerdon of limitation of issues and limitation of
discovery.
One very practical trouble with delaying discovery proceedings until
62. See HANDBOOK, p. 22; Appendix 4, 8, 9, 11-13, 17-20, 37-38.
63. HANDBOOK, p. 28.
64. HANDBOOK, p. 28. (emphasis added.)
65. HANDBOOK, p. 2.
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either final or tentative fixation of the issues is the ultimate delay that
is likely to ensue. Production of documents on the part of the defendants
or their attorneys may take a long time; time schedules for examining
documents have to be worked out, and the answering of interrogatories
may be delayed. A delay in the beginning of the discovery process may
have the consequence of an unnecessarily long delay before the case is
in position for a trial date to be fixed.6" The position of the Report and
the Handbook on this matter has not received unanimous support. Since
the time of the Report, there has been considerable controversy over hav-
ing discovery await fixation of issues and with respect to shifting of
control over discovery from counsel to the court. There has been some
trend in that direction, but not to the extent hoped for by the proponents
of rigid rules of discovery in antitrust cases.6" It may be noted that dis-
covery may have the effect of dropping out issues.6"
The Report devotes some space to the contention that in civil anti-
trust cases, the Government files vague complaints because it lacks in-
quisitorial powers. It may be seriously questioned whether antitrust
complaints are so vague as to justify the attention the Report gives to
particularization of issues."9 The normal antitrust complaint, contrary
to the canons of good pleading, pleads many facts. This may be done to
help the court or the defendants or even, perhaps, to influence the court's
thinldng or to secure a favorable public reaction. On page three of the
66. Where there are several defendants located in different parts of the country,
this kind of scheduling may not be an easy task. The plaintiff's attorneys may, at times,
be asked to look at the documents in the office of the defendants' attorneys which may,
in turn, mean that said attorneys want to have an opportunity to look them over to
ferret out privileged documents, etc., before turning the documents over to counsel for
the plaintiff. In one case with which the writer was associated, examination of documents
of one defendant took place at about five different times because of difficulties of
collecting documents and the effect of rulings of the court on objections, etc. The
availability of the court to hear objections of counsel is among the intangibles which
make it advisable to start discovery processes as soon as possible. And the more this
process has to be gone through, the greater the chances for delay. For an example
of delay after discovery had been stayed, see Leopard Roofing Co., Inc. v. Asphalt Roof-
ing Industry Bureau, 1961 Trade Cas. f1 75302. (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
67. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 1959 Trade Cas. 1 76044
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. Renault, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See
1954 A.B.A REPORT at 18-21; 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 408, 416-17, 507, 510, 577
(1958) ; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 364-65, 615 (1959). See notes 59, 61 supra.
68. See 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 458 (1959).
69. It is this writer's experience, moreover, that discovery in antitrust cases is
used at least as often, and probably more often, to secure proof than to find or expand
issues.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), has become
a landmark in antitrust law. The chief trial counsel for the Government in that case
has noted that virtually none of the many thousands of documents procured by subpoena
from the defendant had been seen by the plaintiff prior to that time. See Rice, Trial
Technique in Antitrust Cases, 7 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 138, 142 (1940).
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Report, reference is made to a number of "big" antitrust cases in which
the complaints or indictments were of great length."0 It is worth noting
that indictments where grand jury investigative proceedings have taken
place have been attacked for vagueness as often as the complaints where
judicial investigative weapons have not been available. The attacks are
generally unsuccessful." It should also be noted that, more often than
not, motions for more definite statements are denied in antitrust cases.
It is believed that such motions are brought as often for dilatory pur-
poses as for clarification. At any rate, when granted, they are a testi-
monial to the courts' resources available for the protection of defendants.
With respect to criminal cases, a defendant has available motions to dis-
miss as well as motions for bills of particulars. The writer is unaware
of any case in the appellate courts where a defendant after trial was
considered to be unduly prejudiced by the vagueness of an antitrust com-
plaint or by unexpected issues.
The Report's approach in this matter is in strange contrast to its ad-
monition that the trial of a big case should be postponed until the court is
convinced that the case has been fully prepared. Full preparation on an
issue of slight importance or on one the plaintiff thinks he is likely to lose
is small comfort to the plaintiff or the public for the loss of an issue of
greater importance or one more obviously violative of the Sherman Act.72
70. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941),
65 printed pages; United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F.
Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946) 33 mimeographed pages; United States v. Food and Grocery
Bureau of Southern California, 43 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Cal. 1941), 125 mimeographed
pages; United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942), 100
printed pages; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), 125 mimeographed pages; United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), 56 printed pages; United States v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co.,
10 F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Ohio 1951), 82 printed pages; United States v. National Lead Co.,
63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), 25 mimeographed pages; United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 93 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1950).
In Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 516
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), the plaintiff's fifty-five page antitrust complaint was stricken and he
vas ordered, among other things, not to plead "unnecessary evidence."
71. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied 308 U.S. 599 (1940) ; Frankfort Distilleries Inc. v. United States, 114 F.2d 824
(10th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) ; United States v. Armour
& Co., 137 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Waltham Watch Co., 47 F. Supp.
524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir.
1944) ; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291 (1923) ; Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaude-
ville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923). See Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13
F.R.D. 41, 43-44 (1952).
72. For the finality courts have given to pre-trial orders, see Annot., 22 A.L.R. 2d
599 (1952). See also Associated Beverages Co. v. P. Ballantine & Sons, 287 F.2d 261
(5th Cir. 1961) ; First Nat'l Bank in Greenwich v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1961) ; Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 291 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Fernandez
v. United Fruit Co., 200 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 935 (1952) ; Sher v.
DeHaven, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936 (1952) ; Isthmian Steamship
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The approach adopted by the Report and the Handbook could well im-
pair the enforcement of the antitrust laws by encouraging prospective de-
fendants not to allow their files to be examined prior to the filing of a
complaint. It is hardly an answer for the Report to suggest that the De-
partment of Justice should ask Congress for compulsory investigative
powers." The courts also have a responsibility to enforce the antitrust
laws with weapons presently available. The Report might well have en-
couraged the courts to request, to the extent feasible, particularization of
issues where this seemed really necessary without encouraging them to
fix a status quo, tentative or final 4 (before trial and before discovery
proceedings), for a case of public interest."5 The trial courts are in full
possession of means to prevent defendants' being surprised at a trial by
new issues. It is to the credit of the judiciary that most judges have
continued to be flexible in this respect.
Where there are a number of plaintiffs or defendants, the Handbook
recommends that all should join in a single set of interrogatories; except
to the extent the separate interest of a party may require a separate in-
terrogatory, which should then be included within the single set."6 This
helps relieve a party from receiving successive sets of interrogatories,
Co. v United States, 191 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See note 41 supra. They are
subject to amendment. They may have the effect of adding issues. Owen v. Schwartz,
177 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1949). At least one appellate court has refused to reverse a
case which was decided on an issue tried by the lower court without objection although
not included in the pre-trial order. Harris v. Harris, 196 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 829 (1952). Courts hardly deserve merit badges for excluding something of
substance at a trial merely because reference was not made to it prior to the trial. Yet
as realistic a judge as Judge Yankwich thought it worthwhile to bring out that in
Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922 (1952), he had refused to allow the
Government to present testimony as to defendants' relationship with a fourth group of
stations by a strict construction of the pleadings and interrogatory proceedings. A Syrn-
poshin on the Use of Depositions and Discovery Under the Federal Rules, 12 F.R.D.
131, 167 (1952); Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 45-46 (1952).
This apparently had the result of shortening the trial but may well have left an issue up
in the air which could have been tried with considerably less effort and time than if made
the subject of a new suit, and may well have jeopardized the adequacy of any judgment
entered in the case. In most instances, of course, considerations of time, expense and
manpower will preclude the possibility of a separate suit with respect to issues not per-
mitted to be tried in a case which, in all probability, has been pending several years
before being reached for trial.
73. It may be noted that for a number of years, the Attorney General has asked
Congress for such legislation, but without success.
74. "Tentative" by some judges, at least, is likely to be indistinguishable from
"final."
75. One defendants' attorney has suggested that an early and strict fixation of
issues in the Government's case against General Motors and du Pont might have pre-
cluded the case being decided on the basis of the Clayton Act. Withrow, Defense
Counsel's View of a Government Civil Antitrust Suit, 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 427,
436-37, 1958. Cf., Maloy v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 283 F.2d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 1960) (desired
issues apparently relinquished because of pressure from court).
76. HANDBOOx, Appendix 24.
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similar or substantially similar to preceding ones, so spaced that the
completion of the answers to one is the signal for commencing the
answers to another. This recommendation may create some problem
where different counsel for multiple parties vary in their diligence, their
work loads, and their willingness to allow someone else to take the lead.
Confidentiality Orders. In order to encourage voluntary response
to discovery proceedings, the Handbook goes very far in advocating pro-
tective confidentiality orders-not only as to discovery prior to trial, but
also as to the use of results of discovery at the trial.7  Normally, it will
be a defendant who will seek such an order. There are limited instances
when secrecy orders are proper,"8 but it is possible for the Handbook to
be construed so as to encourage an area of secrecy beyond such instances
and to promote the granting of broad orders of secrecy. The Handbook
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for government attorneys
handling one pending antitrust case from using various types of informa-
tion obtained in another government antitrust case."9 Such would hardly
be in the public interest.8 " Such an approach is not consistent with the
congressional encouragement to private plaintiffs to use government anti-
trust proceedings in their own antitrust suits, nor is it consistent with
the legislative policy of open depositions in antitrust suits. In recent
years, defendants in government cases have made wide claims of con-
fidentiality which have been resisted by the Government with varying
success.
8
'
Opening Statements and Briefs. The Report recommends the use
of opening statements. The Handbook is less enthusiastic. Where the
trial judge has presided at several pretrials, they are correspondingly of
diminishing utility in a non-jury case. Ordinarily, the value of such
statements will vary in proportion to the extent of preparation by counsel.
77. HANDBooK, Appendix 26, 38-39.
78. The Government and defendants have at times agreed on such orders. See
Freund, The Pleading and Pre-Trial of An Antitrust Claim, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 555, 573
(1961).
79. Recently, a battle over this problem arose in connection with two pending
government antitrust cases. A compromise understanding between counsel avoided a
ruling by the court.
80. See In re Petroleum Industry Investigation, 152 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Va. 1957);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 3722, W.D. Ky., May 23, 1960.
81. United States v. United Fruit Co., Civil No. 4560, D. La., March, 1957, United
States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., Civil No. 14469, W.D. Pa.,
1958; United States v. Driver-Harris Co., Civil No. 942-56, D.N.J., 1956; United
States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., Civil No. 147-231, S.D.N.Y. 1960; United
States v. Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 3722, W.D. Ky., May 23, 1960. In Driver-
Harris, supra, and in United States v. Lever Brothers, Civil No. 135-219, S.D.N.Y.,
1961, there was a contest among multiple defendants on this score. See in general,
Report of Sherman Act Subcommittee on Cost Data Problems in Sherman Act Cases,
17 A.B.A. SECT. ANTITRUST L. 537 ff. (1960).
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Opening statements should not be allowed to become talkathons.82
One may readily agree with the Report and the Handbook that a
brief before trial does help expedite the trial of a big case and is desirable.
It is the writer's belief that such briefs are most effective when compara-
tively short, but this effectiveness may depend upon whether the court
desires an analysis of documents before trial. It is believed that the bet-
ter practice is to serve such a brief on the opposite party, and this has
been the practice of the Antitrust Division.8" Ordinarily a court will be
glad to receive a pretrial brief even though not requested. Where it is
believed that evidence problems may arise at the trial, and pretrial has not
disposed of such matters, it is helpful to have a general discussion in the
brief of the principles of law applicable to such evidence problems. This
may facilitate rulings by the court during the trial, may avoid some ob-
jections, and may result in agreement by the parties at the opening of the
trial as to admissibility of particular items or of a proffered line of evi-
dence. It may also put the court in a position to make broad rulings
when the trial begins.
Handling of Documents. The Report and the Handbook recommend
that the parties be required to exchange proposed exhibits before trial.
In practice, exchanges of documents before trial may be a continuing
process of several exchanges, and it may be advisable to set several dates
at which exchanges are to be made. This is helpful procedure as long
as it is not used to bar the use of additional documents at the trial."' It
82. In the Investment Banking case, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), 66 days were consumed in opening statements-a period longer than
the trial of the average big antitrust case. One defendant's counsel, who has written on
the "Big Case," spoke for 16 days. Government counsel formally objected to the lengthy
opening statements and to treatment of evidence piecemeal.
83. See Special Committee, Streamlining the Big Case, 13 A.B.A. SECT. ANTITRUST
L. 183, 204 (1958); 1954 A.B.A. REPORT 36. Antitrust Division attorneys file pretrial
briefs more often than defendants' attorneys. Thus, in United States v. Oregon Medical
Society, 95 F. Supp. 103 (D. Ore. 1950), and Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1947), short pretrial briefs were filed by the Government, but
not by the defendants. Of course, time and personnel considerations sometimes make it
difficult to file a pretrial brief. Local court rules may require such briefs, but such rules
are, at times, inept for the needs of the "big case." The Handbook is likely to promote
the use of pretrial briefs.
84. In the Oregon Medical case, stupra note 83, the plaintiff, some time before the
trial date, showed the defendants' counsel more than a thousand documents which were
marked at pretrial for identification. These were most of the documents offered by
plaintiff, but during the trial of the case other documents were offered, especially in
rebuttal, as the need arose. Defendants' counsel showed plaintiff's counsel some of their
documents during the recess after completion of plaintiffs direct case, and others after
the defendants' case began.
If, as it would seem, the court itself has a duty in cases of public importance to
adduce evidence the parties neglect, Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsi-
bility, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1293 (1952), it is all the more important that evidence
not be barred at the trial because of counsel's inadvertence, neglect, or even bad faith.
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is not to be assumed that bad faith will prevail in such exchange or that a
court could not deal with bad faith otherwise than by excluding relevant
evidence. It may be noted that it is extremely difficult to determine what
documents are going to be used on rebuttal. Surprise is a very legiti-
mate consideration on rebuttal or cross examination which should not be
dissipated by attempting to have the plaintiff turn over exhibits which
might possibly be used at that stage of the case.
The use of the word "exchange" may or may not be meant to be
synonomous with "show." 5  If permanent exchange is meant, the ex-
change may be a very expensive proposition for plaintiffs who generally
offer most of the exhibits in an antitrust case. It would seem that an
opportunity for observation or a temporary loan should suffice, unless
the other party is willing to pay to have a set of proposed exhibits photo-
stated or photographed.86 Moreover, in many antitrust cases most of
the plaintiff's exhibits come from the defendants' files. In such cases,
the Handbook recommends that the offering party need not furnish
copies of such documents if he identifies them so that a defendant can
find them. 7 When a party proposes to use charts, tables, or compila-
tions, it is helpful to submit copies of these items to counsel for the other
side, and a court might well require the other side to check for accuracy
and to notify opposing counsel of the results of such a check within a
reasonable time."8
The head of the Antitrust Division, in commenting upon this proposed recommendation,
said:
The fullest benefit may be derived from this procedure if each side makes an
effort in good faith to select 'for exchange' the exhibits that it intends to offer,
with the understanding that additional exhibits may be offered if, as frequently
happens, papers in the possession of one side or the other which do not seem
important before trial, become important as the result of developments during
the course of the trial. Such application of this recommendation would remove a
temptation for each side to tender all documents to the other party regardless
of their evidentiary value, thus retarding the trial rather than expediting it.
Letter from H. G. Morison to Judge Prettyman, February 12, 1952, reproduced in 1958
Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 541 (1959).
In government antitrust cases it is common to provide by stipulation, embodied in a
pretrial order, for examination prior to trial of documents intended to be used on trial.
Not infrequently, express provision is made for the use of additional documents at the
trial. See e.g., 1954 A.B.A. REPORT 112; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 634 (1959).
85. In one recent antitrust case, the parties agreed to "exhibit" to each other by
a certain date all papers intended to be used at the trial and thereafter from time to
time such additional papers concerning which it forms an intention of using. The
stipulation provided that it was not intended that either party be estopped from or
prejudiced in offering additional documents upon trial or hearing as the occasion may
demand. But cf., Seminar on Practice and Procedure Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 169 (1961).
86. Ozaliding of documents has been permitted.
87. HANDBOOK, Appendix 48.
88. See Berger v. Brannan, 172 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941
(1949). This has been provided for in a number of government antitrust cases by
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The Report recommends the use of stipulations covering (1) identi-
fication and authentication of documents and (2) undisputed conclusions
upon pleaded issues or conclusions not subject to justifiable dispute. The
Handbook is even more comprehensive on this score.89 Stipulations as to
identifications and authentication of documents are helpful and not un-
common in big antitrust cases."0 Stipulations as to facts have been
used," sometimes as an exhibt in a case ;12 but unfortunately, neither
they nor stipulations as to conclusions of law are very common. Some-
times agreement as to descriptive identification turns out to be a matter
of considerable difficulty. The closer to the heart of the case a matter
appears, the more difficult it is to get counsel to agree on a stipulation.
In addition, the greater the number of counsel involved in a case, the
greater the difficulty in reaching any agreement at all. A carefully
drawn escape clause will often facilitate agreement with respect to such
matters. 3 Courts should encourage escape clauses in pretrial orders or
stipulations concerning documentary proof so as to encourage counsel to
attempt to be both discriminating and cooperative in the belief that in-
advertence or bona fide change of plan will not be penalized because of
a good faith attempt to expedite a case. The better pretrial orders con-
tain such a clause.0" It is the writer's experience that such clauses are
stipulation or pretrial order. See 1958 Seminar, 23 F.D.R. 319, 634 (1959). Its utility is
recognized in the HANDBOOK.
89. HANDBOOK, p. 56 if.; Appendix 48 ff.
90. The stipulation may cover documents produced upon a deposition. In United
States v. Shubert, Civil No. 56-72, S.D.N.Y., 1953, the counsel for the respective de-
fendants confined their stipulation as to authenticity of such documents to those per-
taining to their respective clients but did stipulate that the others came from deponent's
files, and, that if interrogated, he would have testified the documents were what they
purported to be.
91. E.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); C-O-Two
Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
892 (1952). In United States v. National Football League, Civil No. 12808, E.D. Pa.,
1952, a stipulation as to interstate commerce undoubtedly expedited the case. See
note 204 infra.
92. This was done in United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 95 F. Supp. 103
(D. Ore. 1950).
93. "Subject to the right of either party by proof offered at the trial to qualify,
add to, or disapprove the following stipulated facts, and to the right of either party to
contend that any of the facts herein stated are not relevant, competent or material as
evidence in this case, it is agreed that for the purpose of this trial the facts herein
stated shall be deemed true. Unless otherwise stated, the existence of any status referred
to is at least since January 1, 1936, and up to the time of this stipulation." Preface to
Pretrial Stipulation of Facts in United States v. Oregon Medical Society, note 92 sufpra.
See also, Special Committee, Streanlining the Big Case, 13 A.B.A. SEcT. ANTITRUST L.
37, 202 (1958).
94. Thus, in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Civil No. 24-12,
S.D.N.Y., 1950, Pretrial Order No. 1 provided:
The purpose of the foregoing paragraphs of this stipulation is to disclose
before trial and produce at the opening of the trial as fully as possible the
documentary evidence. It is not intended to preclude any party from offering
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seldom resorted to at trial. They serve to give counsel confidence that
any mistake of his or any over-reaching of opposing counsel will be recti-
fiable without arguments, the outcome of which depend upon a court's
discretion. The Handbook recognizes this problem in a well expressed
discussion of escape clauses.95
A sometimes preferable pretrial procedure is to offer documents for
identification in the presence of the court reporter with opposing counsel
noting he does not object to authenticity, subject to any proof to the
contrary which may be adduced at the trial.96 Particular documents may
be challenged at the time of the offer or all objections other than authen-
ticity reserved until the trial. The proponent may briefly describe each
document offered, or merely ask the reporter to get up a transcript listing
the documents with an appropriate description. Some reporters can do
a better job of description than counsel. It may be wise, when there are
a considerable number of doctrmients, to ask the reporter to leave a blank
column in the transcript to be filled in with the page of the transcript of
record when the document is admitted. This same transcript may be
added to as other documents come in during the trial or it may be con-
fined to documents proffered for identification before trial. The Hand-
book recommends having documents marked for identification before
trial.9" If agreement on such matters is impossible or a process of pro-
crastination ensues, counsel for one of the parties may get up a descrip-
any further evidence should, for instance, the materiality or relevance of such
documents be disclosed by the testimony of a witness called by an opposing
party or should the document not be in the possession of the party desiring to
offer it at the time of the preparation of the lists mentioned above, or should the
documents be omitted from such lists by inadvertence. Therefore, without at-
tempting to enumerate all proper grounds for offering such additional docu-
mentary evidence, such evidence may be offered and admitted upon reasonable
notice and upon a showing satisfactory to the court that such offer is not
inconsistent with the bona fide execution of this stipulation. This stipulation
shall not be taken to preclude any party from cross-examining a witness upon
any document or documents subject to rulings of the court.
A similar provision appears in a Supplemental Pretrial Order in United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Company, Civil No. 1216, D. Del., 1949. As to what
may happen without such a clause, see Hoeppner Construction Co. v. United States, 287
F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960).
95. HANDBOOK, Appendix 49.
96. This was done in United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 95 F. Supp. 103
(D. Ore. 1950). In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 93 F. Supp. 190
(D. Mass. 1950), documents were marked for identification before the clerk. See Mc-
Allister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REv.
27, 42 (1950). In United States v. Driver-Harris, Civil No. 942-56, D. N.J., 1956,
the bulk of the documents were marked for identification in the presence of counsel
but not of the judge, before a court reporter. Additional documents were, with consent
of counsel, marked for identification before a court reporter at counsel's office, without
the presence of opposing counsel.
97. HANDBOOK, p. 57. See also 1957 Seminar, 21 P.R.D. 395, 489-90 (1958).
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tive list of his documents before trial and give it to the court for its
convenience during the trial."
The determination of evidence problems may sometimes be facili-
tated by filing with the court as an exhibit a document entitled "Source
Document." This consists of a page or less of symbols and correspond-
ing references, e.g., "A" equals John Doe Company's files. Counsel then
places the appropriate symbol on the document intended to be offered.99
Expert Testimony. The Report suggests the exchange of "canned"
expert testimony before trial. If counsel submits such testimony to op-
posing counsel who has no similar "canned" testimony, the later might
well be required to inform the former what part of such testimony he
expects to challenge and the grounds of the challenge. The Handbook
explores the question of expert testimony at some length. It presents
a number of suggestions on how to deal with this troublesome problem
which defies a single satisfactory solution.
Separation of Issues. The Report suggests that often in a "big
case" it is possible and desirable to break the case down into separate issues.
The Report would require counsel to group exhibits according to the
issues to which they pertain and identify the group with the issues. It
is standard procedure for defendants' attorneys in antitrust cases to at-
tempt to atomize a case, while it may be important to the plaintiff to
have the part considered in the context of the whole case or with respect
to its relationship with other parts. The Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice is on record with the Conference as stating that the
plaintiff's case should be heard as a whole and that it would be a rare
situation when the course of action suggested by the Report would be
practicable. The cases have established the rule that antitrust cases
should not be atomized.100
The Antitrust Division did agree, however, with another suggestion
in the Report that where the case is of a nature to permit it, each party
should be required, where practicable, to present as a unit all its evidence
on each issue. The use of the word "require," however, would seem
98. This was done by the plaintiff in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131 (1948).
99. This was done in United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 95 F. Supp. 103
(D. Ore. 1950).
100. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); United States v.
Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357 (1912); United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544
(1913); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291 (1923); Eastern States Lumber
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 106-7
(6th Cir. 1944), aff d on other grounds, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 695 (1948); C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d
489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). See note 102 infra.
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to make this second suggestion only slightly less dangerous than the first
one. This approach ignores the fact that chronology may have an im-
portance in a case which might be lost or dissipated by strict rules of
topical grouping. It invites counsel to move to dismiss an issue seriatim
during the trial on the ground that all the evidence as to such issue is in
and does not support the proponent's position. It also invites precarious
judgments on the part of counsel as to when to leave an issue and whe-
ther to allocate an exhibit to a particular issue or issues."'0 It invites
counsel to claim a document as relevant to many issues, thereby providing
ground for much argument during the trial. It makes it difficult to ac-
commodate the needs or convenience of witnesses. It has been the writer's
experience that counsel generally try to do what the Report suggests, but
that exceptions are often necessary. Counsel may well be encouraged to
adopt an orderly system of proof, but a requirement of the sort suggested
seems neither wise nor practicable.0 2 The trial brief can make an analy-
sis and grouping of exhibits far superior to that possible by a physical
grouping of documents.
The Report would require that documents of similar content or
effect be grouped and their similarity be announced by offering counsel.
This second requirement is said to be for the purpose of permitting the
court to deal effectively with cumulative evidence.' This verges on
having the court substitute itself for counsel. 4 No attorney trying a
case before a hostile court should be limited in making a record, with an
101. In the Investment Banking case, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), a pretrial order provided that where documents constituted an
identifiable group in chronological sequence, the group was to be offered in evidence,
and when a portion was relevant to a later subject matter, reference might then be
made to them. This would make the pigeonholes flexible, but seems to make the logic
of a grouping depend largely upon the order in which issues are to be dealt with at the
trial, rather than on the relative importance of particular documents to particular issues.
There was considerable departure from this requirement at the trial of the Investzent
Banking case, stpra.
102. See United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 903-4 (D.N.J.
1949), where General Electric sought to separate the documents to which it objected
into isolated parts. Cf., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 F.R.D. 1, 6
(S.D.N.Y. 1939). The 1954 A.B.A. REPORT, although supporting the position of the
REPORT, contains many qualifications in recognition of some of the problems which strict
adherence to it would entail.
103. See text following note 158 infra.
104. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 10 F.R.D. 618 (D. Del.
1950), Judge Leahy, in denying defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to limit itself to a
certain number of documents, remarked that care should be taken with innovations in this
field that they not be used to deprive counsel of the right within reasonable limits to control
the preparation and presentation of his case. As to the effect upon a defendant's case of not
offering evidence, see C-O-Two Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 496 (9th Cir.
1952). As to a criticism of the "just enough evidence" approach, see Niresk Industries,
Inc. v. FTC, 1960 Trade Cas. ff 76511 (7th Cir. 1960).
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appeal in mind, because of a general approval of rigid exclusionary
ru~les.'" 5
105. It is believed that the opinion of the District Court in United States v. Oregon
Medical Society, 95 F. Supp. 103 (D. Ore. 1950), suggests a considerable bias by the
judge against the plaintiff for whom this writer was counsel. After the court had glanced
at many of the plaintiff's documents before trial, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: "That leaves, then, I guess, for discussion the motion to inspect
or the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum which I took under consideration and
have had under consideration for some time. For purposes of the record, the
motion was filed on August 20, 1949. I am open to further persuasion or
argument, Counsel, but it seems to me, after going through a thousand or more
documents that I have already seen, that your theory of the case is covered very
well by documentary matter."
COUNSEL: "Your Honor, may I point this out, that undoubtedly there will be
a number of factual issues which will be a matter of interest. It is one thing
to leave issues of that sort to a matter of inference where other information
is not available; it is an entirely different matter, entirely another matter to
allow that issue to be left as an issue to be determined by inference when there
may be additional evidentiary material which would clear that matter up, and not
leave it to an inference. It is our belief that the correspondence of these de-
fendants will clarify a number of factual issues which otherwise would be left
to inference. Your Honor, I would consider as an attorney of this Court and an
officer of this Court that I have an obligation, not only to the Government but
to the Court, to make available to the Court for use in determination of this
case all the evidentiary material that may be available. I cannot conceive that I
could so fill that obligation completely if I could not have the correspondence
and other documents we have asked the defendants for, so that I could proffer
them to the Court."
THE COURT: "I do not think I am denying you any documents. I have seen
more than a thousand documents and I think they cover the whole ground of
your case."
COUNSEL: "Your Honor, you have not seen the correspondence between these
defendants and others"?
The COURT: "Why do I have to see these thirteen years' correspondence of
the State Medical Society"?
COUNSEL: "Because that correspondence, Your Honor, might clarify whether
or not these defendants, in various aspects of the case, have done certain things
or have not done certain things."
THE COURT: "You keep minimizing what I have said. From what I have
seen, it seems to me you have documented your case."
COUNSEL: "Your Honor, you leave me somewhat uncertain as to the meaning
of that observation. If Your Honor means that the documents we have presented
make out a prima facie. . ."
THE COURT: "If I mean you have won your case, certainly not; but if I
have ever understood anything, I understand the theory of the case, and it seems
to me that the theory of the case has been very adequately documented from
what you have got before me already."
COUNSEL: "Your Honor, let me clear this one point, among others: Suppose
the defendants, as they have said, take the position that prior to a certain period
these defendants did certain things; after that period they did not do certain
things. Suppose the correspondence between OSMS and OPS shows that they
have actively been engaged in doing these various things."
Record, Vol. 1, pp. 3-5, United States v. Oregon Medical Society, mipra.
The court refused, up to the time plaintiff rested, to allow subpoenas to be issued
for or inspection had of the correspondence and certain other documents of two of the
major defendants. He stated that he would permit counsel to call for specific documents
as need arose during trial. At the time of resting, counsel for the plaintiff made a
number of observations too lengthy to reproduce in full here, but the following excerpts
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The Handbook recommends that a pretrial order should establish
the sequence in which issues should be tried. Evidence is to be presented
separately and seriatim as to each issue to the extent possible, but wit-
nesses should not be required to make multiple appearances."' This is
some improvement upon the recommendations in the Report, but it is
sufficiently similar to raise most of the problems discussed to this point.
"Cut-off" Dates. The Report noted that in antitrust litigation the
Government frequently asserted, as relevant and material, facts concern-
ing the operations of defendants over long periods of time. It is stated
that the incidence of the formation of a conspiracy may be proved no
will serve to indicate the dangers of rigidity in matters of this sort:
Plaintiff believes that its exhibits, and the evidence produced at the trial, prove
the allegations of its complaint, but since the Court, and not the plaintiff, must
decide this case, counsel for the plaintiff believe they have an obligation to this
Court and to the Government, to present to the Court relevant evidence which is
not merely cumulative. Counsel believe that they have an obligation to the
Court, and to the Government, to exercise their judgment as to what evidence
should be offered, and that such judgment cannot be exercised without being per-
mitted to examine the documents requested in the motion. Counsel for plaintiff
state that, in view of the evidence already offered, counsel would not expect to
introduce in evidence any considerable part of the correspondence and other
records of defendants called for in the subpoena, but would want to introduce
such correspondence and records as they believe should be called to the Court's
attention.
Plaintiff believes that such motion should be granted before plaintiff rests
its case, for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff believes that the correspondence
of these defendants will show that many acts in pursuance of the conspiracy
charged have been performed during all of the years 1936 to 1949, and that in
many instances an intimate connection with this conspiracy on the part of in-
dividual defendants will be shown by such correspondence.
We refer to two incidents which illustrate the points made: (1) According
to exhibits and testimony, Drs. Shields and Beck notified the Multnomah County
Medical Society of their intention to resign from the Oregon Medical Service
Bureau (Weston). We believed they had been subjected to disciplinary pro-
ceedings, and on October 26, 1949, called for defendants to produce records of any
disciplinary proceedings in which those doctors had been involved. Next day,
those records were produced. On examination of those papers, it was found
that not only had Drs. Shields and Beck been called in for disciplinary pro-
ceedings, but also a number of other doctors about whom we had no knowl-
edge. . . . In our opinion, the disciplinary records of the defendants mentioned
would reveal similar confirmatory proof as to other doctors, as would their cor-
respondence. (2) We were informed, on October 26, 1949, that in Yamhill
County the local medical society, in association with the Oregon State Medical
Society and the Multnomah County Medical Society, had taken action to prevent
a cooperative health organization in McMinnville from getting under way in
1947. We had to prepare to present that situation, and to present it to the
Court, without having seen defendants' correspondence, which we believe exists,
in respect to that situation. The records of defendants we have sought to sub-
poena might well reveal other situations similar to that in McMinnville.
Record, Vol. 1, pp. 918-19, United States v. Oregon Medical Society, supra.
It may be noted that the court found that if there had been a conspiracy, it had been
abandoned about 1941. As to why a controversy as to the issuance of a subpoena arose,
see 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 347, 350-51 (1959).
106. I-ANmoox, p. 53.
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matter when it occured, but that overt acts or courses of action may well
be irrelevant to any present remedial or punitive action, if remote in
time. The Report asserts that the trial judge is fully justified in limit-
ing proof of action alleged to have been performed pursuant to an estab-
lished conspiracy to a period of time reasonably relevant to present pos-
sibilities of effective judgment. More than one counsel for a defendant
and more than one judge are likely to disregard the qualifying language
in the Report, "established conspiracy." It will be a rare judge who will
tell counsel to omit proof of past events because he is satisfied that con-
spiracy has been established, especially if the question arises prior to trial.
The Handbook states:
The period of proof should be defined and limited by the trial
judge at a conference prior to trial. . . Protracted cases, and
particularly antitrust cases, frequently become unduly protracted
owing to the "ancient history" which is recited at length in the
complaint and put in issue by denials contained in the answer.
The value and importance of establishing cut-off dates have
been emphasized by committees studying the problems pre-
sented by the big case. Careful consideration of the possibility
of limiting the period of proof (particularly in civil antitrust
cases brought by the Government) may reveal fertile ground
for the development of ways and means of shortening otherwise
long cases.117
In support of all this, the Handbook cites the Report, '° the 1954 A.B.A.
Report,' and the Attorney General's National Committee Report."1 '
The Handbook also quotes several passages from an opinion by Judge
Holtzoff."' In that opinion, he attributes inordinate length of trials in
107. HANDBOOK, p. 54. The HANDBOOK suggests the following form of pretrial
order: "The Court will not receive evidence as to Issue-relating to a period prior
to. . . . This date shall not operate as a cut-off date with respect to evidence prior to
that date which the offering party shows is relevant and should be received." App. 48.
This may represent some slight retreat form the position taken in the body of the
HANDBOOK.
108. Pp. 21-24.
109. Pp. 26-32.
110. ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 364 (1955).
111. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 20 F.R.D. 441,
442 (D.D.C. 1957). As to two of the government's counts, a tentative ten year cut-off
period was imposed. As to the third count, a longer period was permitted. This oc-
curred in connection with discovery proceedings. The court, however, gave the Govern-
ment leave to raise the matter again at pretrial and stated no reason had been presented
to him to go back to the time requested by the plaintiff. An interesting sequel occurred.
On February 10, 1958, Judge Holtzoff heard argument covering a "cut-off" date on the
introduction of evidence. At the conclusion of the argument, he stated that he had
become convinced that it would be "improvident" to fix a cut-off date at that time, noting
that to do so might deprive a party of its rights, and left the question open until trial.
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antitrust litigation largely to voluminous evidence reaching back many
years that eventually has proved unnecessary. This, says the Judge, has
created serious difficulties for the federal courts throughout the country.
This writer, however, has yet to see the exponents of this point of view
demonstrate its validity by specifying any antitrust case where a lengthy
trial was caused by unnecessary ancient evidence."' A cut-off minded
judge at the discovery stage of a proceeding might gravely impede the
ascertainment of necessary relevant facts.
The Department of Justice agreed with the objectives of the cut-off
recommendations in the Report."' It noted, however, that it would be
a rare judge who, prior to completion of a trial, would notify counsel
that he believed a conspiracy had been established. The Department also
pointed out that it is often necessary to prove a conspiracy to show a
series of acts which, by their very cumulation or persistency over a
period of time, are probative of a conspiracy or attempted monopoly."'
It might have been added that it is proper in antitrust cases to take into
consideration the proclivities of a defendant in determining the judg-
ment to be entered against him."' In considering divestiture or divorce-
ment relief, the circumstances of the acquisition or the misuse of pro-
perty are relevant. This may well necessitate delving into antiquity."'
Monopoly and merger questions will often require examination into an
informative past or, in the first instance, into a past to determine whe-
ther it is informative. Almost always when the Government seeks to
112. The writer believes that he is familiar with the antitrust cases that had come
before Judge Holtzoff at the time of his remarks in the Maryland & Virginia Milk Pro-
ducers case, supra note 111. It is not believed that any of such cases, even though with-
out cut-off dates, were of inordinate length; or that, if any evidence distant in time from
the date of filing of the complaint was offered, it was appreciable in amount.
113. 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 542 (1958).
114. See discussion of this matter in Dession, The Trial of Economic and Techno-
logical Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L.J. 1019 (1949). Compare McAllister's statement that
proof of conspiracy is often proved by overt acts, that the distinction between con-
spiracy and overt acts is thus lost in the law and in the typical government tactics of
proof, and that the only remedy is a flat cut-off. McAllister, The Judicial Conference Re-
port on the "Big Case": Procedural Problems of Protracted Litigation, 38 A.B.A.J. 289,
349 (1952). In United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), Judge
Medina, during the trial, announced a cut-off date of 1935, but shortly reconsidered and
later stated he was glad he had not used a 1935 cut-off date.
115. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 343, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
116. See Schine Chain Theatres Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948). In a
generally favorable resume of its brief experience since the REPORT, a former head of
the Antitrust Division, in a letter of June 4, 1952 to Judge Prettyman, stated: "I am
'sure that their continued use will prove even more of a benefit to the bar and to litigants
provided the courts are careful to comply with the evident intent of the Judicial Con-
ference that the rights of all parties to adduce all of the evidence necessary to present
the position of each such party should be protected."
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delve into the past, it has some reason to believe the delving will be
productive.
Overproving one's case is less likely and certainly less dangerous
than having the court asking counsel, "Is that all you have?""'  The
number of overt acts counsel believes should be presented may be re-
lated to his belief of hostility on the part of the trial judge. Where such
belief exists, counsel must expect to have the laboring oar on appeal,
and an appellate court may well be more reluctant to overturn findings
of fact where only a few overt acts tend to discredit the finding, than
when there are a number.
Sophisticated modern executives, counselled by sophisticated mem-
bers of the antitrust bar, may take care that current files appear innoc-
uous.18  Nevertheless the patina of an apparently colorless document
may take on a different appearance when matched with an earlier docu-
ment. 1 Periodic destruction of documents, a business practice of many
corporations, or destruction for a more specific purpose, may create
documentary time gaps. 20 In such cases, support for a bridge between
such gaps may have to come from evidentiary pieces far apart.'2 ' The
117. In United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 351-53 (1947), divesti-
ture relief was denied largely because of absence of evidence in the record relating to
the plants in question.
118. A story told in government circles-the accuracy of which the writer does
not vouch for-is to the effect that an attorney was hired at least in part for such pur-
pose by a large business firm. He was shocked and chagrined to find his client indicted
and convicted for a conspiracy to fix prices without damaging evidentiary bits of paper.
There is no reason to believe that he knew what the officers of his client were doing on
the sly. The indictments returned in Philadelphia last year against a number of large
corporations and some of their officers make fascinating reading of how to conspire
without dirty corporate documents. The allegations have not been proved by evidence
in a trial, but a number of the defendants attempted to plead nolo contendere and some,
who were not permitted to so plead, have pleaded guilty.
119. Let us take a merger situation. A current document shows that the defendant
company at the time of the merger had 20% of the market and the acquired company
"X" had 10%. Then, it might be asked, why have discovery beyond the approximate
time of the merger? There are many reasons, a few of which may be noted. What has
happened in the industry over a period of years may be quite important. The defendant
may have internal records which provide such information which may not be readily
ascertainable elsewhere or may be a matter of serious controversy if derived from other
sources. Again, a five year old document which says, "When and if 'X' attains 10% of
the industry, we should acquire it to maintain our leading position," would be quite
pertinent.
120. Antitrust lawyers have publicized their advice to clients concerning the latter's
files. See, e.g., Van Cise, Practical Planning, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N SECT. ON ANTI-
TRUST LAW, ANTITRUST SYMPOSIUM 103, 114 (1951). Destruction of documents, even
after a complaint has been filed, has taken place in antitrust cases. Prompt discovery
may prevent such destruction of relevant documents.
121. In one case with which the writer was associated, business destruction of docu-
ments was claimed by five defendants. Considerable light on current status and current
activities was had from documents which had been secured by the Federal Trade Com-
mission as of a period prior to such destruction.
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emphasis of the Report and the Handbook is on discouraging the use of
evidence more than a few years old. Yet in many antitrust cases, the
courts have recognized the value of such evidence. 2' One of our greatest
jurists has said, "A page of history is worth a volume of logic." ' 2 No-
where is this more true than in many types of anti-trust cases.
It has not been unusual that defendants' attorneys have paid parti-
cular attention to this part of the Report. In many an antitrust case since
the time of the Report, the cut-off issue has been a battleground con-
tributing markedly to the protraction of pretrial proceedings. In 1952
and 1954, related events took place wlich were particularly seized upon
by the cut-off proponents. In 1952, in the Oregon Medical case, 124 justice
Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court, made an oblique allusion to
122. "In antitrust cases, it is deemed essential to develop fully the background of
the facts out of which the conspiracy is alleged to have arisen and in the midst of which
it operated." United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 903 (D.N.J. 1949).
The court, at p. 903, cites a number of Supreme Court decisions as strongly emphasizing
this principle. See also Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952) ; A.L.B. Theater Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas.
69305 (N.D. Ill. 1959) ; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 703-06 (1948) ; United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 368 ff. (1948); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 789-93, 804-05, 809 (1946); United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 173 Fed. 177, 184 (E.D. Mo. 1909) ; United States v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 19 F.R.D. 122, 134 (D.N.J. 1956). In the case of United States
v. United Fruit Co., Civil No. 4560, E.D. La. 1957, the court, over defendant's objection,
permitted interrogatory questions going back to 1899.
The problem may arise in connection with the use of subpoenas. Compare It re
Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.R.D. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1947) with In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion, 33 F. Supp. 367 (M.D.N.C. 1940), or in respect to interrogatories, United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1952 Trade Cas. ff 67717 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
It should be noted that generally the amount of evidence necessary to show early
history is not substantial. The amended complaint in United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) was filed in 1940. Trial took place in 1945. Certain
aspects of plaintiff's documentary proof went back many years. Thus, to show that the
ability of the unintegrated defendants to get first run playing time into the affiliated
theatres had not bettered in recent years, the Government set up a table in its trial brief
showing statistics for 1931, 1942 and 1944. Other such tables based particularly upon
interrogatory answers and admissions of fact by defendants were used to show the ex-
istence and maintenance of monopoly power. A quotation from that brief attests to the
value that early documentary evidence may have:
Thus the Paramount and RKO theatre interests in Michigan were consolidated
with those of Butterfield by a twenty-five year agreement made in 1927, which is
still in effect. (Ex. 387). The same parties in 1933 pooled all of the first run
theatres in Grand Rapids by an agreement (Ex. 386) which also restricted fu-
ture theatre acquisitions in the town by either party.
To show the evolution of provisions in the printed license forms used by defendants,
plaintiff went back to 1917. The plaintiff put in its main case in the Paramount suit in
three days.
In United States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the fact that events of
some 40 years were referred to did not militate against the case being decided on a mo-
tion for summary judgment. So, also, in the case of Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1959) (over 80 years).
123. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
124. United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
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an "archeological approach" in terms likely to disturb an archeologist. 2 '
In the context of that case the remark seems particularly inappropriate.'
The 1954 A.B.A. Report supported an early cut-off. Relying heav-
ily on the Oregon illedical case, the Report stated: "In that case the
Government offered evidence covering conduct over an eighteen year
period from 1930 to the date of the complaint in 1948. The trial court
rejected evidence relating to evidence prior to 1941. Error was assigned
by the Government on this point."' 27 This was a highly erroneous state-
ment." This writer has had lengthy correspondence with officials of
the American Bar Association and with the Chairman of the Committee
responsible for its utterance in an unsuccessful effort to obtain an official
125. The court in this connection cites the REPORT.
126. See note 128 infra.
127. 1954 A.B.A. Report at 31.
128. The evidence was admitted. The Government, of course, could not and did
not assign rejection as error. The Supreme Court stated that the trial court rejected a
grouping by the Government of its evidentiary facts into four periods-1930-1936, 1936,
1936-1941, and 1941 to trial. It stated that the trial court accepted the period since the
organization of the Oregon Physicians' Service (1941) as significant and rejected the
earlier years as "ancient history." Justice Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court,
said the trial court was correct in rejecting pre-1941 events as establishing the govern-
ment's cause of action and stated the Court adopted this division of time periods of
1936-1941, and 1941 to trial. Since there was nothing in the trial court's opinion or
findings or in the parties' briefs in the Supreme Court to indicate what the govern-
ment's pre-1936 evidence consisted of, Justice Jackson's remarks lacked foundation in
the record and thus seem particularly inappropriate.
The complaint, filed in 1948, charged a conspiracy starting about 1936. The plain-
tiff's pre-1936 evidence consisted of the following: One exhibit (Ex. 2083), a 1930 ar-
ticle in the defendant's official journal deploring private clinics and prepaid medical care
organizations; one exhibit (Ex. 664) showing substantial growth of the latter between
1933 and 1936; and five exhibits dealing with restrictive practices of a prepaid medical
care organization approved and participated in by defendants, and the latter's attitude
toward that organization prior to 1936. Not only did this organization continue to exist
long after 1936 under different names and subject to and imposing similar restrictions,
but it also was a predecessor of Oregon Physicians' Service which took over certain of
such restrictions. Some of these documents were published and distributed by defendants
after January 1, 1936. Of the five exhibits, three were part of a 1935 report which in
1936 was made the basis of drastic action by the defendants, including the expulsion of
doctors over a number of years after 1936. One was a 1940 transcript of disciplinary
proceedings in which an officer of one of the defendants made the following remark con-
cerning private prepaid medical care organizations: "They have never had the approval of
organized medicine, and it was only with the depression, about ten years ago that any
effort was made to curb them." (Ex. 1057, p. 7).
In the context of this article, it is relevant to ask how much time of the court was
taken up with this pre-1936 evidence. Reference to this evidence did not exceed fifteen
minutes at the trial. In a trial brief of 516 pages, 11 pages were devoted to this material,
consisting in part of excerpts from a 1936 publication of the defendants. In contrast, the
trial court admitted over plaintiff's objections correspondence between doctors and pri-
vate prepaid medical care organizations relating to their experiences with such organi-
zations not only prior to 1936, but prior to 1930. It was the plaintiff which objected to
the introduction of evidence on the ground of remoteness.
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retraction.'29 The quoted statement has been used in a number of instances
by defendants' attorneys in government antitrust cases seeking to curtail
discovery proceedings or the use of evidence.' It has also been re-
ferred to as gospel by speakers and writers.
We may note that the Supreme Court in the Oregon Medical case
said: "Of course, present events have roots in the past, and it is quite
proper to trace currently questioned conduct backwards to illuminate its
connections and meanings."'' It is encouraging to note that although
sporadic support has been shown for rigid cut-of fs,'32 most courts have
refused to be rushed in yielding to requests therefor, and have either
acknowledged the worth of such evidence or the right of counsel to
demonstrate its worth.' 3
With all due deference to the authors of the Report, it is believed
that such evidence is generally relevant and normally not very time con-
suming; complaints by judges of such evidence have been as rare as the
absence of complaints by counsel for defendants who fear the less hidden
past more than the more sophisticated present. 4 The past is often a
clue to the nature or motivation of present events, as well as being ex-
planatory of a present status. The fact that over a period of thirty years
no new competitors came into an industry may well be more probative
of monopoly than the fact that none came in during the past three years."'
129. The Vice-Chairman of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar
Association agreed with this writer that the statement was in error. The Chairman of
the Committee, however, took the position in a letter of June 26, 1957 that: "We merely
paraphrased and quoted the Supreme Court's opinion which stated that the trial court
had 'rejected' pre-1941 evidence in arriving at its decision." The 1958 A.B.A. SECT.
ANTITRUST L. 201 does not refer to the Oregon State Medical Society case in support of
a cut-off date.
130. E.g., United States v. United Fruit Co., Civil No. 4560, E.D. La. March 1957.
United States v. Driver Harris Co., Civil No. 942-56, D.N.J. 1956.
131. 343 U.S. 326, 332 (1952).
132. 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 514-15; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 408; Aus-
tin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. 1 74814 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) ; United States v. The Borden Co., 1953 Trade Cas. 1 68323 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
133. Metzger v. American Window Glass Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 1 74595 (E.D. Pa.
1958) ; Sandee Mfg. Co. v. Rhom & Haas Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 1 75194 (N.D. Ill. 1959) ;
Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Cf., Philco
Corp. v. FCC, TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) 1 70063 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 1961);
Cf., 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 521 (1958) ; see note 122 supra.
134. There are many antitrust cases in which such evidence has been received with-
out any apparent issue to it being raised.
135. Thus, in Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), plaintiff
showed that over a long period of time Hartford either refused to give applicants li-
censes or gave them very restricted licenses. Defendants as to some could make a
plausible explanation, but found it difficult to do so in the face of both the length of time
during which Hartford so acted and the number of times such action occurred. This
case illustrates another danger of relying entirely upon the present. By the time of the
suit, a number of glass container companies had become satisfied with their own re-
stricted status because others, in turn, were restricted from competing with them; and
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A pre-war act similar to a post-war one may have more significance than
what occurred during a more recent war period. The average judge is
quite capable of protecting a defendant from prejudice arising from an
exploration into a disreputable past which has no relevance to the issues
in a case.'36
Evidence of Post Complaint Changes. The trial of an antitrust case
generally should not be permitted to be prolonged by allowing the de-
fendants to adduce evidence of changes in practices arising after the
filing of the complaint." 7 They should, however, have such opportunity
after being found to have violated the antitrust laws. A device some-
times used is to have a pretrial order provide for the reservation of evi-
dence pertaining to the judgment to be entered until (and if) the de-
fendants are found to have violated the law. This may be feasible in
some cases, but in others it will not. In general, matters of status and
change of practices post complaint may be more readily weighed after
trial of issues of violation than other matters upon which the terms of
a judgment should depend.'
there were so few glass making machinery manufacturers extant that it took extensive
history to show that what looked normal was abnormal, and to show how the industry
had reached such status and what had happened to actual and potential competitors.
136. Cf., Alamo Theatre Co. v. Loew's Inc., 143 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
137. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 11 F.R.D. 308 (D. Del.
1951). It has been said, however, that when the defendants in the du Pont suit opened
their case, the court admitted post complaint evidence of expanding competition in the
industry and cessation of alleged restrictive practices. Gesell, Review of Procedure in
Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1085 (1952). See also United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 162 (D. Del. 1953). In a
recent case in which the large meat packers sought to have prohibitions in a 1920 con-
sent decree lifted, they were allowed, over the government's objections, to adduce proof
of matters, occurrences and conditions existing beyond the time of their filing their peti-
tion to amend. United States v. Swift & Co., Civil No. 58C613, N.D. Ill., Transcript, 1960.
Evidence disprobative of the charges should be admitted no matter when it occurs.
Where there is an issue of mootness, such evidence may also be relevant.
138. United States v. L. D. Calk Co., 114 F. Supp. 939 (D. Del. 1953). A good
deal of time and effort may be lost if there is a long lull between the time of termination
of the trial, the decision of the court, and another hearing as to the judgment to be en-
tered. Both court and counsel may have to renew acquaintance with a case that has
grown cold. Findings of fact upon which a judgment should be based present a problem
in such a situation. Should the court make, or counsel propose, findings before a hearing
on the judgment but after a violation has been found? Should there be two sets of
findings ?
The problem of the plaintiff and the defendant may well not be the same. The defendant
may desire to adduce the current situation as of as late a date as possible. The plaintiff,
in order to show how property was acquired or used, or to show the proclivities of the
defendants, may have to go back a considerable period before that time. The availability
of witnesses may be an acute problem. In some areas trial of an antitrust case may not
be reached until three or four years after the filing of complaint, and a decision may
not be forthcoming until some time later. An example of a case where the nature of the
evidence made entry of a complete judgment possible is Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948), which is to be contrasted with United States v.
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Bulk Documents. The Report and the Handbook devote a good
deal of space to the subject of bulk documentary evidence. It is not un-
common in antitrust cases for a large number of documents to be offered
at the opening of the trial. This frequently is done at the specific request
of the judge.' 0 With respect to such bulk direct evidence, the Report
and the Handbook recommend that in pretrial conferences the judge an-
nounce that he will not admit to the record unassorted, unexpurgated, or
unidentified documentary material. The Report also recommends that
when only portions of documents are admissible, the offering party pre-
pare and supply copies of those portions with accompanying identifica-
tion of their source. The whole of the document should be available to
the judge and counsel for purposes of identification and cross examina-
tion, but physically the record should consist of the copies of the relevant
portions only. 4' The Report contains the somewhat confusing recom-
mendations that evidence which is merely "possibly helpful," or which
merely implies an "atmosphere," or "background," may be rigidly ex-
cluded. Then, after admitting such evidence may be desirable in the
ordinary case, the Report states that in the big case, "that which is un-
necessary should be strictly excluded from the record."'' The Handbook
does not go as far in this respect as the Report, and adopts a more prac-
tical approach which, nevertheless, still seems too rigid. 4"
Before commenting on the above recommendations, it should be
pointed out that in a big antitrust case, the plaintiff almost invariably
offers the major part of the documentary evidence. The first of the
above two recommendations, if applied as a general rule to the trial of
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) where the nature of the evidence made
entry of such judgment impossible. The last was streamlined, the first was not.
139. In the Investnent Banking case, exhibits were given an intricate system of
marking numbers and letters, according to whether they were received against all de-
fendants, against some, whether received subject to connection, motion to strike, etc. A
pretrial order provided that a series of underwriting agreements be offered as a single
exhibit and that certain documents relating to public sealed bidding be fastened together
in one volume and offered in evidence as such, but that separate exhibit numbers be
given. The value of such an intricate system of numbering is open to question.
140. REPORT, p. 21 ff.
141. REPORT, p. 25. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in a letter
of February 15, 1952 to Judge Prettyman, assumes that "unnecessary" qualifies the
cecommendation of rigid exclusion. The letter notes that, "background evidence in many
antitrust cases is often necessary to a full understanding of the industry involved, see e.g.,
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106." To that case might be added
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317
U.S. 519 (1943). See note 122 supra.
142. "A party offering any documents shall indicate on the document the portion
relied upon, if less than all [and only that part shall be read]. In the case of lengthy
documents or books, copies of the parts relied upon shall be prepared and used as ex-
hibits. The whole shall be available for examination, but normally will not be admitted."
25 F.R.D. 461 (1960).
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an antitrust case, might at times impose an intolerable and impractical
burden with respect to expense and personnel upon a plaintiff. Thus,
in the Oregon Medical case, minutes of medical societies, editorial com-
ments, and articles in publications of the defendants were put into evi-
dence by the plaintiff. In many instances, a page of the minutes would
contain two or three relevant paragraphs interspersed among ten or more
irrelevant paragraphs. In some instances where the writer of the min-
utes showed his independence of paragraphing, there would be relevant
sentence and irrelevant sentence nudging one another on a single line,
with or without punctuation. To have had to make copies of the relevant
portions would have been an extremely difficult, time consuming, and
expensive enterprise." 3 The use of excerpts may also engender argu-
ment which may nullify the time saving element. 44
The problem, where it is a problem, may generally be met less dras-
tically by crossing out irrelevant parts on the document offered, 4 ' by
distinctly marking the portions relied upon, or by doing as was done in
the Oregon Medical case, where counsel for the plaintiff gave court and
opposing counsel a list of documents, designating the portions offered-
where such designation was practicable. In most instances the relevant
material on a particular page was readily discernible. Entire irrelevant
pages were not offered. In many instances, a statement of the purpose
for which a document was offered served to earmark the relevant por-
tions of the document. Where adequate trial briefs are filed with the
court, the judge will rarely be troubled over such matters unless he at-
tempts to try most of the case in pretrial. If a party is able and willing
to furnish to the court and the other side excerpts and/or digests of the
143. As to how the problem was met in that case, see note 157 infra. Generally,
the relevant material is so clearly distinguishable from irrelevant matter in a document
that no real problem of confusion or time consumption exists. This is all the more true
when, as generally happens, counsel has made reference to the document with respect to
a particular point he is trying to make.
144. In the du Pont case, defendants filed comments respecting plaintiff's proposed
findings. It was asserted that the Government did not offer many documents which ex-
plained or qualified those excerpts used by the Government and that a great many of
the excerpts offered by the Government were designed to create an inference contrary to
the substance of the document as a whole or to omitted statements. See also Seminar,
28 F.R.D. 37, 153 (1961).
145. This is also done for Supreme Court printing purposes when the original
record is sent up to that Court from the trial court. In some cases the actual record to
be used by a court may be shortened, with the cooperation of counsel, by putting a series
of descriptive documents in evidence and then before the court reporter, but not neces-
sarily before the court itself, briefly summarizing the contents of the documents-the
summarization to be part of the transcript. Unless something unforeseen arises the
parties and the court thereafter may use a reference to a few pages of the transcript in
lieu of many pages of exhibits. This was done in part in the Schine case with respect
to a series of leases. Counsel should, however, be required to have such matter intro-
duced before the court if either counsel so desires.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
documents he intends to offer, he should be encouraged to do so by the
court's willingness to receive such aids. However, compulsion to use
such system is an entirely different matter.
Burden on -Party Offering Documents. The Report recommends
that the party offering or proposing to offer quantities of documents
should be required to show that they are competent, relevant, and material.
This recommendation has met with some support.4 ' The Reports admits
that such action would be a reversal of traditional procedure. Since
documents in an antitrust case are primarily those offered by plaintiffs,
this recommendation effectually creates a presumption of inadmissibility
with respect to documents offered by a plaintiff in antitrust cases. It
is a proposal which appears to run counter to Rule 43 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as well as to the enlightened tendency to libera-
lize rules of evidence generally and especially in antitrust cases."4 7 In
practice, it may even defeat its only justification since in the trial of a
big case, as to many documents, ordinarily no objections are raised and
no arguments had.'48 The procedure suggested by the Report will invite
argument as to admissibility of documents which under traditional pro-
cedure would never arise. This is particularly true if this recommenda-
tion extends to the individual documents which are part of a group. 4"
A document obviously admissible would always require an explanatory
appendage. In antitrust cases it is rare for a document to be attacked
for incompetency, but under the Report recommendation, competency
would have to be explored. The Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice supported this recommendation, but was of the view that the
party offering the documents could make his showing in general terms
146. See 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 465 (1958).
147. See Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 655 (1952); Buttle, Trial Problems in Antitrust
Litigation, 19 BROOxLYN L. REv. 169, 189, ff. (1953) ; United States v. General Electric
Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 903 (D.N.J. 1949). See note 30 supra.
148. A counsel objecting to an offer of a document can generally do so by the use
of the word "irrelevant," etc., but it is doubtful that the proponent could satisfy this pro-
posal by offering a document and saying it was "relevant."
In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), Pretrial Order No. 1 provided that prior to the trial, sets of documents were to
be prepared and marked with exhibit numbers. Documents relied upon by the parties
were to be offered at the opening of the trial subject to appropriate objections. At the
opening, counsel were to be given the opportunity to discuss the contents, significance,
and interpretation of documents. Following discussion, objections might be argued. It
is said that 15 days were spent in discussing the Government's documents and 6 days in
discussing the defendants' documents before trial. See McAllister, The Big Case: Pro-
cedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HA~v. L. RFv. 27, 37 (1950). In United
States v. United Shoe Viachinery Corp., 93 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1950) many days
were also spent discussing documents.
149. Competency, for example, is much more likely to be a problem with respect to
particular documents than with respect to large groups of documents.
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unless the court or opposing counsel required more details.'
The Handbook is less far-reaching in this area than is the Report.
It recommends that where documents are offered in a group the offering
party should demonstrate that the "group of documents is relevant and
material."'' It omits reference to "competency." The basic approach,
however, is the same. The writer does not believe that it is proper to
assume that the plaintiff's attorney is offering a group of documents
which are irrelevant or immaterial. If defendant's counsel believes they
fall into those categories, he should be required to raise that issue."2 A
recommendation of this sort would seem to entail more work, rather than
less, on the part of the judge.' It might lengthen rather than shorten
protracted cases.
Relevance of a mass of documents in an antitrust case might well
be left to be shown by what counsel do with the documents in a brief:
Do they or do they not spell out a relevant story? It might very well
be that in a non-jury antitrust case where there are a great many docu-
ments, the court might avoid all rulings on evidence at least as to rele-
vance until its final decision, at which time it might merely indicate
what documents it did not regard as admissible.' A party should not
be prejudiced, however, by a delayed ruling of inadmissibility when the
evidence is important and counsel has not been given an opportunity to
state whether he is able to substitute other admissible evidence. Where
there has been objection to an offer of such evidence, it would behoove
counsel to ask for an early ruling.
5 5
In the Oregon Medical case, the plaintiff's documents on direct were
admitted "subject to objection."' 5 In an endeavor to obtain a definitive
150. 1957 Scninar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 542-43 (1958).
151. HANDBOOK, p. 58.
152. Pursuant to other recommendations of the REPORT and the HANDBOOK, nor-
mally he would have become familiar with such documents before the trial.
153. The 1954 A.B.A. REPORT, while endorsing the Conference REPoRT on this mat-
ter, refers to its failure and ultimate inutility in the Investment Banking case, United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), and cautions that counsel should
not be required to justify each exhibit. The 1958 A.B.A. SEcT. ANTITRUST L. 202, would
require the offering party to show that the group of documents is relevant and material.
It is silent on the question of competency.
154. Cf., United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 229, 242 (W.D.
N.Y. 1945).
155. In United States v. Shubert, 14 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) a stipulation em-
bodied in an order of the court provided "if the court does not rule as to the admissi-
bility of any documents prior to the completion of plaintiff's main case, either counsel
may ask the court for a ruling and if any documents are ruled inadmissible, the court
shall grant counsel a reasonable opportunity to offer substitute proof if counsel specific-
ally state they wish to make such offer." Cf., SEC v. Glass Marine Indus., 194 F. Supp.
879 (D. Del. 1961).
156. Strangely enough, plaintiff's documents on rebuttal were admitted without
such qualification, except for one or two which were expressly excluded.
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ruling as to a certain class of documents, counsel for the plaintiff filed
a list of all documents stating whether a document was filed for all pur-
poses or specific purposes. Counsel for the defendants did the same
with his documents and both sides filed written objections." 7 Despite
all this, no express ruling was obtained from the court. While it is be-
lieved all the documents were regarded as admitted, the court's opinion
gave very little inkling of whether it had excluded any evidence or whe-
ther it had used any particular evidence in reaching its decision." 8
Cumulative Evidence. The Report recommends that where there
are large amounts of documentary evidence, the judge should limit ad-
mission to that which is actually necessary to his consideration of the
case. It is said that merely cumulative evidence should be excluded and
its availability can be summarily noted on the record. Such approach,
without cautionary language, leaves much to be desired. Instead of
counsel deciding what is "necessary" for his case, the court is likely to
assume that function, even when it is going to decide the case for the
157. The preface to plaintiff's list stated: "Unless otherwise specified, all of the
exhibit is being offered. In the case of a few voluminous documents, and a few docu-
ments with many paragraphs of diverse matters, which contain interspersed clearly
relevant and clearly irrelevant matter, the whole document has been offered because of
the complexity in setting down on paper what parts are offered and what are not.
"Statement as to the purpose for which the exhibit is offered. When letters are of-
fered for all purposes, they are also offered: (1) to show the state of mind of the writer
or person on behalf of whom the letter was written; (2) the fact that it was written by
the person whose signature or initials appear or on whose behalf it was written; (3)
that it was sent to the addressee, and the addressee received it; (4) and when taken
from the files of a particular hospital association that it was brought to the attenion of
that hospital association.
"Unless the offer is qualified, sample contracts, circulars, certificates and tickets of-
fered are offered to show type of business engaged in, type of service and coverage of
service, as well as for the information contained in such exhibit. As to circulars, they
will be offered also for the fact that, as circulars, the matters contained therein were
publicized in Oregon. Whenever a Northwest Medicine, Medical Reporter, or Bulletin
of the Multnomah County Medical Society is referred to, the name and date of publica-
tion is included in the offer. It is also offered for the fact of the contents being circu-
larized among Oregon doctors, and that the latter have knowledge of the statements
made, as well as for other specified purposes.
"The term 'for information therein' is not intended as a limitation of purpose, but
for the most part indicates that its contents are thought to have a less obvious bearing
on the conspiracy by themselves than those offered for all purposes. Plaintiff reserves
the right, after the defendants have filed objections to any exhibit, to enlarge on the
purposes for which it is offered."
The plaintiff's written objections to defendants' exhibits were prefaced by the state-
ment: "In addition to the reasons for objection to defendants' exhibits hereinafter listed,
plaintiff also objects to any correspondence prior to January 1936, on the ground of
remoteness. Absence of objection to any of defendants' exhibits is not to be deemed
acquiescence in their admissibility for the purpose of defendants' offer, but that they
may be admissible for other purposes."
A pretrial order in the du Pont case provided for the filing of written objections to
documents. Cf., SEC v. Glass Marine Indus., 194 F. Supp. 879 (D. Del. 1961).
158. 95 F. Supp. 103 (D. Ore. 1950).
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other side. It should be remembered that a judge who is satisfied with
two documents need not read ten others just because they are in the
record. Summary notation on the record of availability of evidence is
likely to raise perplexing problems in getting up a record for the appel-
late court. What was said earlier with respect to the problem of cumu-
lative evidence is also applicable here."5 9 The situation may well differ,
however, where the proponent agrees unreservedly with the court that
X documents make the use of Y documents unnecessary. The Report's
recommendation does have the merit of preserving some sort of record
of "cumulative evidence." The court might also ask counsel to try to
agree that the record note the availability of other prospective witnesses
who would testify along the same lines as previous witnesses."'
Underlying Data. The recommendations of the Report and of the
Handbook with respect to identifying, rather than offering, underlying
data are often adopted in antitrust cases.' Here again, however, if the
proponent desires to offer underlying data in evidence, it may be ac-
cepted without the court's being required to look at it. Of course, if
the summary is disputed and the parties disagree as to what the under-
lying data shows, admission and consideration of such data may be
necessary.
Depositions. The Report recommends that summaries of volumi-
nous depositions be used in lieu of the deposition. This may be difficult
to do for already overburdened legal staffs. It may also lead to endless
arguments, since one party will rarely be satisfied with the other's sum-
mary. In the du Pont case in Delaware, when the court asked for sum-
maries, the wrangle that ensued was finally solved by the use of the
159. See text following note 102 supra.
160. In Emich Motors v. General Motors, 340 U.S. 558 (1951), after seven wit-
nesses had testified in rebuttal to another witness that they had not been coerced, the trial
court refused to allow additional testimony of this sort, but did allow an offer of proof
outside of the jury. 49 S. Ct Rec. & Briefs, 6440-45 (1950).
161. The HAWn0o0 recommends that where the other side has seen the underlying
data, only so much data as is necessary to present objections should be made part of the
record. 25 F.R.D. 424 (1960).
In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), it was stipulated
by the parties that daily tobacco buying reports might be introduced by the Government
by production of the boxes or containers, each of them to be identified as an exhibit and
to be treated as introduced in evidence as a whole and except where particular documents
were to be taken from the mass or read or exhibited to the jury, they were not to be
copied into the record, it being understood that with that exception production was to
enable statistical studies to be made.
In United States v. Imperial Chemical Ind., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
paragraph 15 of Pretrial Order No. 1 stated that no objection to a schedule or other
compilation would be made on grounds that the source material of such schedule or other
compilation was not available in court, provided that the identity and location of the
source material was indicated on the schedule or compilation, and a copy furnished the
other party not later than 30 days in advance of their being offered in evidence.
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depositions. Most depositions are fairly short. "2  Nevertheless, the idea
of using summaries is a step in the right direction. It is believed that
it is better to offer this possibility to counsel as a permissible tool rather
than a suggested one. Designation of parts of depositions a party desires
the court to read and counter-designations by the other party offer, how-
ever, a better method to save time and shorten the record.6 ' The Hand-
book favors designation or summaries if there is agreement as to the
latter.'6
4
Discussion of Relief. The Handbook recommends that discussion
be had at pretrial as to what relief would be appropriate were the allega-
tions in the complaint proved, or as to what relief the Government and
the defendants would accept in a consent decree 6  The 1954 A.B.A.
Report recommended that the Government be required to spell out in
detail at the outset the relief desired in civil antitrust suits brought by
it. 6 These can be very dangerous recommendations. Use of such
recommendations is likely to lead to pretrials being used for compulsory
settlement purposes. Many a judge has a hesitancy or even mental block
as to relief in an antitrust case which he does not have with respect to
the question of violation. Often it takes long familiarity with a case and
full development of the facts before a court is ready to grant adequate
relief. An early discussion of relief is likely to elicit from a judge the
remark, "I'll never give you such relief," ''1 r and creates an atmosphere
not consonant with either the advancement of an unhampered trial or
the promotion of a proper judgment.
Settlement negotiations, especially in a big antitrust case, are not
a matter of conference of an hour or two. They are often long and
drawn out, extending over weeks or months, with numerous meetings.
At such conferences, rhetoric may not be altogether absent, but it is at
a minimum as there is no judge to seek to influence. Informality, taking
162. See Symposium on the Use of Depositions and Discovery Under the Federal
Rules, 12 F.R.D. 131, 134, 136 (1952).
163. See 1954 A.B.A. REPT. 50-51; 13 A.B.A. SEcT. ANTITRUST L. 204-05 (1958).
164. HANDBOOK, pp. 63-64. On this question of depositions, see also 1957 Seminar,
21 F.R.D. 395, 513 (1958) ; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 462-63 (1959).
165. HANDBOOK, pp. 44-45; App. 42. See also 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 408
(1959).
166. See also 13 A.B.A. SECT. ANTITRUST L. 197-98 (1954).
167. This happened in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948) in the trial court. The case went to the Supreme Court twice on the question
of relief. More recently, a discussion of relief at pretrial in an antitrust case led to the
court's ire over counsel's refusal to back down from a significant part of the relief sought
after the court indicated it would not give such relief. The writer recognizes that a
judge, at the outset, might say: "I don't see why such relief might not be proper."
While this might induce an early settlement, it might invite lengthy argument by de-
fendants. and a request to prove the contrary.
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time to check a claim, and many other factors are involved in such nego-
tiations. Pretrial conferences are neither of the same mold nor an ad-
equate substitute for such negotiations. Nor should counsel be put in
a position of revealing his evidence at a pretrial on particular points when
faced with the possibility that a trial may be forthcoming if the confer-
ence is not successful.
The procedure suggested would also promote lengthy complaints
in which elaborate allegations of intermediate as well as ultimate facts
would greatly inflate antitrust complaints. Complaints do and should
vary in the specificity of the relief prayed for. This may be because
discovery is more necessary in one case than another, because of differ-
ences in the complexity of the industry involved or-because of the desir-
ability of having the defendants initially submit a plan of divorcement
or divestiture.
The writer does not believe that relief should never be discussed at
a pretrial. If the parties have had settlement negotiations and have
agreed on all except one point, then if both sides are willing to have the
judge decide this point, a long trial may be unnecessary. But it may be
noted that even in this instance, argument before the judge may not be
enough; it may be necessary to adduce evidence with respect to such point.
It would seem, therefore, that with rare exception, there should not be
a discussion of or ruling upon relief at pretrial before the facts have
been adduced in full.'
Timetable. The establishment of a timetable, rigid enough to put
some pressure on counsel to act within a reasonable period of time, but
flexible enough not to prejudice non-dilatory preparation of one's own
case or answers to demands by one's opponent, is often desirable.' In
one case with which this writer was associated, refusal of the judge to
impose time limits on defendant's counsel resulted in at least a year's
unnecessary delay as well as a violation of the time limits imposed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Samples, Surveys and Polls. It is often found in antitrust cases,
particularly those involving merger, that the critical issue of published
168. In United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., Civil No. 9-C163, E.D.
Wis. 1959, after settlement negotiations broke off, the defendants in June 1960 filed a
motion to enter a judgment proposed by them. Upon the request of the court, the
Government filed a counter judgment and a brief in opposition to defendant's motion.
At the time of this writing the matter is still pending. In United States v. Allied Chem-
ical Corp., Civil No. 59-784, S.D. Mass, 1960, the court on November 28, 1960,
orally announced its intention to deny a similar motion. A consent judgment was then
negotiated.
169. See Streamldning the Big Case, 13 A.B.A. SEcT. ANTITRUST L. 183, 195;
HANDBOOK, p. 39.
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market statistics are either not available or do not meet orthodox rules
of evidence. Polls, sample surveys, or broad surveys at the instance of
one or more of the parties are then undertaken. After tremendous ex-
penditures of time and money, they may be thrown out by the court
upon objection of a party, admitted but given little weight, or be the
subject of extensive testimony and argument. Where such survey or
poll seems necessary or desirable, the court should endeavor to have
counsel for the parties agree on how such survey should be made; and
if agreement is not to be had, the court should advise counsel at pretrial
of the guidelines upon which, if followed, the survey will be admitted.17
If problems arise in the making of such a survey, the court should be
available to pass or advise upon proposed solutions. In general, it is
believed that surveys and polls should be readily received in antitrust
cases, with attention on objections confined largely to weight, rather
than to competency. 1 It should be noted that the Handbook adopts a
more cautious approach to sample surveys and polls.72 than is warranted
in a treatise designed to cut down on the length of protracted cases.
Discussion of Documents in Briefs. In lieu of lengthy discussions
as to masses of documents, it would seem that in many such cases much
time could be saved by having the parties submit briefs to the court, and
then having the court hold a one-day hearing on points that remained
bothersome. Moreover, in a case where there is going to be a substantial
number of witnesses, it is often helpful for counsel to read from exhibits
once or twice a day for short periods of time.' This gives counsel a
chance to emphasize his more important documents, to tie up or support
the testimony of a witness while his testimony is still fresh in the mind
of the court, and helps break up the monotony which often occurs in a
long trial. Of course, in many instances, discussion of a document is
170. Cf., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 305 (D.
Mass. 1953).
171. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 25 F.R.D. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
See United States v. National Homes Corp., TRADE REG. REr'. (1961 Trade Cas.) 70095
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 4, 1961). In the Paramount case, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), the Govern-
ment, to show in what theatres motion pictures customarily played first run, selected
certain pictures during certain years for that purpose. See United States v. Swift & Co.,
Civil No. 58C613, N.D. Ill., Oct. 2, 1959. Surveys conducted by a defendant or by a third
party for a defendant, found in defendant's files, have been used by plaintiffs in antitrust
cases. Government counsel are as prone to make technical objections to surveys as
are counsel for defendants. In United States v. Brown Shoe Co., Civil No. 10527, E.D.
Mo. the court, in face of objections by both sides, did admit a number of surveys, but
rejected other tables based upon Bureau of Labor statistics and Bureau of Census data
where the original data was not available to counsel.
172. HANDBOOK, pp. 72 ff. See also 13 A.B.A. SEcr. ANTITRUST L. 219 (1958);
1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 477 (1959).
173. Cf., Yankwich, Observations on Antitrust Procedure, 10 F.R.D. 165, 169
(1951).
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immeasurably aided by having on the stand a witness who is familiar
with it.
Designation of Spokesmen. Where there are a considerable number
of counsel for defendants, it may save considerable time and confusion
for one of them to be designated to deal with the plaintiff respecting
questions arising in connection with documents.
Motions. In the Besser Mfg. case,' a pretrial order required that
motions on pleadings be made forthwith. While the making of motions
directed to the pleadings at an early date should be encouraged, they
should not be cut off by any time limit if their disposition would expedite
the trial. Thus, the striking of parts of a complaint or an affirmative
defense should not be defeated by the time limitations of Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This may be accomplished by a
liberal exercise of the court's initiative when a belated motion brings
the matter to its attention,17 or by accomplishing the same result as a
motion to strike by a pretrial order under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules.
Pretrial conferences sometimes serve as a means for hearing motions
which otherwise might not be heard, or would be heard only on an in-
frequently scheduled motion calendar.
Camwd Testimony. A trial may be expedited by the willingness of
the parties to permit written statements of witnesses with the preface:
"If called to testify the undersigned would testify - -." This is more
often done with respect to defendants' witnesses than with respect to
those of the plaintiff, but in a few instances within the writer's know-
ledge, the Government was the beneficiary of such an agreement.'
Judges should be willing to require, when one side so desires, when ap-
preciable time and expense would be saved, and when no substantial con-
siderations otherwise negate, that a written statement be admitted; sub-
ject to the right of the opposing party to have the writer available for
cross examination, with the judge to determine on whom the expense
should fall. There are often certain subsidiary issues for which this
174. Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
175. See United States v. Shubert, 14 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
176. E.g., affidavits in Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952), and
numerous statements in affadavit form in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131 (1948). In United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952),
plaintiff offered without objection letters from a Regional Director of Wages and Hours
located in California, stating the position that organization had taken with respect to
employees of certain companies, and also a letter from an insurance official respecting
use of certain insurance forms in effecting malpractice insurance. In the Paramount case,
supra, statements of certain persons as to their position with various companies were in-
troduced in evidence by the Government. See 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 615 (1959).
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procedure in whole or in part is particularly apt."'
List of Documents. Where the use of a number of similar docu-
ments is necessary to prove a point and both sides have access to the docu-
ments, it should be possible to file a list of such documents by stipulation
or upon affidavit of counsel that the list is what it purports to be, rather
than having to offer the actual documents. An example might be where
it is sought to show the existence of a general practice, denied by de-
fendants, through the use of many similar contracts . 7
Excluding Evidence of Immaterial Defense. The Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice has pointed out that many antitrust
cases could be shortened if judges were strict in excluding evidence in
support of immaterial defenses such as "good motives. '" 70  On this point,
however, the Report and the various American Bar Association reports
are silent. The Handbook does not press this means of expediting the
big case. This is a matter which could and should be disposed of at pre-
trial by the court's ascertainment from defendants whether justification,
good motives, and the like are going to be raised as defenses, and the
making of a decision at that time as to whether to receive evidence with
respect to such defenses.
Advance Determination of Evidence and Law Problems. Certain
types of evidence problems, such as competency, can often be disposed of
before trial ;1o but it is debatable whether to require, as has been done in
177. Cf., 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 521 (1958) ; 1958 Semnhar, 23 F.R.D. 319,
410 (1959). In a recent case, in answer to interrogatories, one defendant listed 10 times
as many alleged competitors as enumerated by the other four defendants. The court was
not willing to adopt a procedure whereby letters would be secured from executives of
such companies stating what products were made by their companies, with a right re-
served to defendants to call them for cross examination if so desired.
178. In United States v. Shubert, 14 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), several lists of
documents containing uniform provisions were agreed upon by counsel, thus effectively
reducing the number of documents to be offered at trial.
179. Letter from head of Antitrust Division to Judge Prettyman, February 2, 1952,
in 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 543 (1958).
180. In the Investment Banking case, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), before trial the court had the parties submit briefs as to the admissi-
bility of testimony previously given before a congressional committee. See also Carlock
v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 16.261, Case 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1944) ;
Penn v. Automobile Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 337 (D. Ore. 1939) (admitting testimony of
a witness at a prior trial) ; Volk v. Paramount Pictures, 91 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn.
1950) (admissibility of judgment obtained by Government); United States v. Driver
Harris Co. Civil No. 942-56, D.N.J., 1956, pretrial order of April 7, 1961 (documents) ;
Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1961
Trade Cas.) 1 70051 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1960) ; United States v. Certain Tracts of
Land in Los Angeles County, 63 F. Supp. 175, 181 (S.D. Cal. 1945) ; Parmelee Trans-
portation Co. v. Keeshin, 1960 Trade Cas. 1 76682 (N.D. Ill. 1960). Cf., United States
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 10 F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Ohio 1950). In United States
v. Shubert, 14 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where many of the allegations as to the
course of business activities of defendants were admitted, the Government brought on a
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some cases, that evidential objections be made and disposed of before
trial. The Handbook provides for this procedure, but does not insist up-
on it. Theoretically, this procedure could save much time at trial and
enable a party to know whether he can rely on what he has as enough, or
whether he needs more evidence to prove a point. However, it also has
the offsetting tendency of promoting a host of objections which other-
wise might not be made.'81 A general statement of purpose for which
classes of particular documents are offered may be of some help in such
a situation.
In some instances, it should be possible to have advance determina-
tions made of law questions during pretrial ;182 which would govern the
trial unless controlling precedent or a showing of manifest injustice later
otherwise persuades. 3
The Handbook states that the court should, in the pretrial schedule,
arrange to hear and rule on any motions raising or attacking affirmative
and other defenses that are not so closely interwoven with the main body
of the case as to make a separate hearing impracticable or unvise. 4 It
also lists many types of issues, some of which would be raised by way of
affirmative defenses, which it considers possible issues for separate trial.185
Where affirmative defenes or other defenses lend themselves to deter-
mination apart from the merits of a suit, the court generally should be
willing to determine them prior to the trial. 8 On the other hand, if the
amount of evidence on such issues is not substantial and the question not
free from doubt, justice in the form of a speedy trial on the merits may
call for all such matters to be gone into at the trial.'87 At the trial, more--
motion to strike affirmative defenses as to interstate trade and commerce, in part at
least to obtain an idea of how deeply it would have to go into such matters at the trial.
See DowThe Pretrial Conference, 41 Ky. L. REv. 363, 374 (1953).
181: In one case with which this writer was associated, defendants objected to:
Each exhibit which is or purports to be an intra-company communication, com-
ment, memorandum or report . . . and each communication . . . of or from
any other defendant to this defendant, or to any person not a party to this suit,
or from any such person . . . because such exhibits, (1) are not binding upon
this defendant, (2) are hearsay and not the best evidence, (3) consist of opinion
and conclusions, (4) do not constitute . . . records . . . made in the regular
course of business, (5) were not made by any authorized person.
182. See 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 400-01 (1959).
183. 1958 Semzinar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 408-09 (1959).
184. HANDBOOK, p. 37.
185. HANDBOOK, p. 52.
186. See 13 A.B.A. SEcT. ANTITRUST L. 194-95; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 415
(1959).
187. Cf., Donlan v. Carvel, TRADE REG. RE'. (1961 Trade Cas.) ff 70086 (D. Md.
April 17, 1961). In recent years in a number of antitrust cases, plaintiffs have been
confronted with long periods of delay before a trial on the merits because defenses of
statute of limitations have gone through district and appellate court stages.
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over, such defenses may never be pressed.18
Request to Admit. Judges in protracted cases should take a more
liberal view with respect to requests to admit.'89 They should not hesi-
tate, as many do,9 ' to require a request for further admission to be
answered where the circumstances so warrant. Many a big case, where
control of a market is in issue, could be appreciably expedited if courts
would not be frightened by, the fetish of "opinion" to require an answer
to an interrogatory asking a defendant to list its competitors.' 9' A re-
quest for admission of facts keyed to documents available to both parties
might be a tool to expedite the trial of an antitrust case.'92
Summary Judgment. Courts should be receptive to motions for
summary judgment in antitrust cases, especially where factual disputes
are reduced to a minimum by the use of probative documents or by the
absence of serious conflicting factual contentions in the affidavits of
both sides. No more than with respect to pleadings 93 should an antitrust
case be considered in a special category as to the applicability of summary
judgment.'94 There is much precedent for the use of a motion for sum-
mary judgment in antitrust cases.' 95 The more frequent use of such pro-
188. See 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 504 (1958). Of course, this may be of small
comfort to a plaintiff who has spent much time and effort in preparing to meet this
defense.
189. Cf., Dow, The Pretrial Conference, 41 Ky. L. REv. 363, 369 (1953) ; 1958
Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 533-34 (1959). But see Freund, The Pleading and Pretrial of
An Antitrust Claim, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 555, 568-70 (1961).
190. E.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
1959 Trade Cas. 11 76229 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
191. Courts are split on this matter of "opinion." The defendant normally will
know all its competitors or at least all those of any significance. If it really is not in
position to make an unqualified assertion, it merely can give a qualified one. For a
liberal approach to this problem of opinion, see United States v. Renault, Inc., 27 F.R.D.
23 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
192. In United States v. Shubert, 14 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), counsel for
plaintiff prepared a narrative statement as to the history of theatre holdings in a certain
city based upon some hundred documents, with footnote references to the documents. De-
fendants refused to stipulate to this statement, but when served with a request to admit,
did comply with the request. See 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 539 (1958).
193. See text following note 44 supra.
194. Judge Weinfeld's approach in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 157
F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), leaves much to be desired in this respect. But see also
Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In a recent
antitrust case in the Western District of Pennsylvania, the court indicated its intention
to follow the Bethlehem case upon being advised of a party's intent to file a motion for
summary judgment even before he had any knowledge of the factual basis for his motion,
based on the area of factual dispute between the parties.
195. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) ; International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ; United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
340 U.S. 76 (1950); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United
States v. General Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157 (D.N.J. 1949) ; Sandidge v. Rogers,
167 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Ind. 1958); H. J. Heinz v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181
F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hilton v. Triangle Publications, Inc. 27 F.R.D. 468
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cedure for partial or entire judgment purposes, where documents or
statistical material are the heart of the case for one or for both sides,
might well expedite the disposition of an antitrust suit. Even when de-
nied, such a motion may measurably shorten the trial of an antitrust
case. 9 ' It will generally be advisable to provide in a pretrial order cover-
ing the authenticity of documents that it be applicable on motions for
summary judgment as well as at a trial."7
Offering or Reading Whole Documents. Time might be saved if
courts refrained from requiring that the whole of a document be offered
or read merely because part of it was read by one party. Where un-
dramatic interrogatory answers are desired to be used in evidence, time of
the court might be saved by introducing them before the court reporter,
if counsel are willing, either by reading them or filing a copy with the
clerk of the court and having the reporter note the offer in the transcript.
Joint Objections. Time may be saved at a trial by agreement that an
objection by counsel for one defendant will be deemed to be made on be-
half of all except where express disclaimer is made. Where there are a
number of counsel for different defendants, a joint brief by them deal-
ing with common problems often helps lessen the ultimate number of
pages of briefs submitted to the court. 9 '
Interstate Commerce. A difficult problem arises where the question
of interstate commerce is a serious one. The court can hear the evidence
on that question and on the merits together, and the convenience of wit-
nesses often is a strong inducement for this procedure. The court may
ask that the interstate commerce issue be decided first, or only after it
has held for the plaintiff on the merits, or after denial of a motion to
dismiss at the end of plaintiff's case. As early as possible, the court
should indicate whether it is seriously concerned over an interstate com-
merce defense so that the parties may have some conception of how much
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.)
% 70053 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1961). Cf., Atwood v. Kerlin, 264 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
196. As it did in the Bethlehem case, 157 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See 1958
Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 424-25; 1957 Seminar, 21 F.R.D. 395, 520 (1958) ; Freund, supra
note 189 at 576-77.
197. "Subject to correction, if and as error may appear, the following provisions
will apply to documents . . . marked for identification . . . intended to be relied upon
by the respective parties upon the trial of this cause, or (b) used on a motion for sum-
mary judgment." Pretrial Order in United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., Civil No. 14469, W.D. Pa., 1958.
198. In some cases, the practice has been to file such brief together with individual
briefs dealing with particular problems of particular defendants.
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proof seems to be called for.'99
Book of Excerpts. It may be possible for counsel to make up a book
of excerpts from exhibits, interrogatory answers, depositions, and ad-
missions. Counsel could then offer the documents, and use the book of
excerpts during the trial ;200 or possibly even offer the book of excerpts
in evidence.
206
Reference to Prior Proceedings. The trial of a number of antitrust
cases could be expedited considerably if the courts would allow a wide
breadth of reference to prior proceedings in which the defendants have
been involved, particularly where both involve the antitrust laws and the
alleged violation is an element in the second case. The plaintiff or the
defendant, as the case may be, should be allowed to refer to the fact of
conviction, acquittal, judgment of violation, or dismissal, as evidence to
be considered along with other evidence. It should also be possible to
refer to facts in the prior case, developed by testimony or documents in
that case, by reference to an available record of that case or a relevant
portion of its record which has been made a part of the current record.
It should, of course, be open to counsel to attempt to explain away the
prior decision by attacking or refuting the prior testimony or documents.
Where the history of an industry has been surveyed in one case, a suc-
ceeding case should be able to rely upon that history, subject to the right
of counsel to argue or offer proof to the contrary. Documents authenti-
cated in a prior case should not have to again be authenticated by their
proponent. A court in pretrial conference might well have counsel agree
as to the use of relevant parts of the prior record, subject to the right of
counsel to explain away or impeach such parts. The State of Louisiana
has gone quite far in this direction." 2 Although there is considerable
199. In the Investment Banking case, supra, Pretrial Order No. 3 provided that no
separate proof as to interstate commerce be received except on motion by plaintiff on
leave of the court just prior to resting its case.
200. This was done in United States v. Linde Air Products Co., 83 F. Supp. 978
(N.D. Ill. 1949). As to using as an exhibit a document summarizing other bulky docu-
ments, see Seminar, 28 F.R.D. 153 (1961).
201. See HANDBOOc, App. 49.
202. LA. REv. STATS. 51:133 (1950):
In any suit under this part . . . the judge shall receive in evidence any record
or parts of the record of any court of any state or of the United States in any
legal proceeding to which the defendant is or has been a party, on the condition
that all the record is produced unless the certificate of the custodian shows that
all of it is not available. However, the testimony of a witness shall not be re-
ceived unless the party against whom it is offered has the opportunity to cross
examine, but the defendant may put the record or parts of it in evidence whether
the state or other plaintiff has had the right to cross examine or not, and in the
absence of denial, explanation, or counter proof, the . . . record, or testimony,
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts set forth.
The above is part of a statute dealing with monopolies.
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authority for such an approach," 3 some courts have refused to shorten a
trial by reference to another proceeding." 4  In Paramount Pictures, Inc.
v. United States, 20 5 the trial court allowed in evidence decisions by arbi-
trators and an appeal board which had dealt with the activities of par-
ticular defendants in particular localities. The Government had not
been a party to those proceedings. Some courts, in patent and trade-mark
cases, give weight to decisions of other courts relating to the patent or
trade-mark in question.00
Stipulation of Facts. The court should encourage counsel to stipu-
late facts or to state what alleged facts they will not contest.0 7
Authenticity. While a passing reference to the problem of authen-
ticity has been made elsewhere in this article,08 it is a problem which
needs further comment. In a case where there are many documents, all
or almost all of which come from the defendants' files, undue protraction
is caused by a plaintiff having to go through a step-by-step authentica-
203. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 38, 70, 74, 76 (1911). That
the defendant appellants contested the use of the prior Ohio proceedings, see 26 S. Ct.
Record, Appellants' Oral Argument, p. 28. Also see Grant Brothers Const. Co. v. United
States, 232 U.S. 647 (1914); Noble v. United States, 319 U.S. 88, 93 n. 4 (1942) ; Dob-
son v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489, 501 (1943); United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U. S. 495, 532 (1948); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 251
Fed. 617 (7th Cir. 1918); United States v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 67 F.2d 37
(10th Cir. 1933) ; Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1938) ; Pfotzer
v. Acqua Systems, 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579,
583-84 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952); Friedman v. Sealy, Inc., 274
F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Kawneer Mfg. Co. v. Toledo Plate & Window Glass Co., 232
Fed. 362 (E.D. Mich. 1915) ; Emerson Electric Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phono-
graph Corp., 24 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); United States v. Siegel Bros., 52 F.
Supp. 238 (E.D. Wash. 1943) ; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323,
341 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) ; City of Bridgeport v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 105
Conn. 11, 19-27, 134 Atl. 252 (1926). Cf., Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 400 (1961).
204. Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55,
63 (1918); Twentieth Century Fox v. Brookside Theatres, 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 F.R.D.
48 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In Monticello Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 197 F.2d
629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952), the reluctance of the court to allow any
use, for the greater part of the trial, of the record in the government's case against the
defendants had much to do with the large size of the record.
205. 343 U.S. 131 (1948). This material was received by the trial court over
strong objection of the counsel for defendants.
206. See Kawneer Mfg. Co. v. Toledo Plate & Window Glass Co., 232 Fed. 362
(E.D. Mich. 1915) ; Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 428 (1932) ;
Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 24 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.
N.Y. 1938) ; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 251 Fed. 617 (7th Cir.
1918).
207. See HANDBOOK, p. 43; 1958 Seminar, 23 F.R.D. 319, 462 (1959); Jinkinson,
Observations on the Trial of an Antitrust Case, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 551, 559-60 (1960).
208. See text following note 88 supra; Seminar, 28 F.R.D. 149 (1961). As to the
use of a request for admission of facts for such purpose, see United States v. National
Surety Corp., 25 F.R.D. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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tion of documents. The Handbook. 9 has an admirable exposition of
how to eliminate or lessen this problem, but its Appendix discussion does
not lean toward compulsion as in the case of requiring plaintiff to show
relevance and materiality. Pretrial orders are often based upon stipula-
tions of the parties, and some of such orders provide for authenticity of
documents with the right of defendants to show otherwise at the trial,
while others merely provide for authenticity if not objected to on that
ground. Defendants are in the best position to show whether "X" really
signed a document and had the authority to do so. The courts should
therefore press counsel to accept a pretrial order of the first type and not
of the second, unless counsel can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
court that there is a genuine dispute as to authenticity.21 In this connec-
tion, a case with many documents can generally be expedited through col-
laboration of counsel in the use, as an exhibit, of a position identification
list of personnel whose names appear on documents.
Conferences Between. Counsel. Where objections are made to dis-
covery proceedings, the Handbook1. admonishes that the court should
require counsel to confer prior to any hearing on the objections to see
whether the objections can be obviated or the area of dispute narrowed."12
Where motions are made, a similar procedure seems advisable. This
should not only save time for the court and counsel, but should also have
the effect of curtailing broadside objections.
PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Almost all government civil antitrust cases and some private anti-
trust cases are tried before a judge without a jury. Most government
criminal cases and most private antitrust suits are tried before a jury.
Federal Trade Commnission cases are tried before a hearing examiner.
Certainly, many of the tools discussed in the Report and the Handbook
are worthy of consideration whether the trial is before a court or jury.
However, the closer that particular subject matter comes to a decision on
the merits, such as "cumulative evidence," the less applicable such recom-
mendations may be to jury trials in view of the danger that the judge
will usurp the functions of the jury. On the other hand, it would seem
that many judicial recommendations could properly be applied, as some
are, in Federal Trade Commission proceedings.
209. HANDBOOK, App. 52-53.
210. For a stipulation obviating this issue, see 1954 A.B.A. REPORT 149. See also
13 A.B.A. SECT. ANTITRUST L. 197 (1958).
211. HANDBOOK, p. 41. See also 13 A.B.A. SET. ANTITRUST L. 196-97.
212. That it is easier to make counsel confer than to have them reach agreement,
see United States v. Carter Products, Inc., 4 F.R. SmEv. 2d 33.342, Case 3 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
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In criminal cases, the Handbook recommends that many of its recom-
mendations be purely on a voluntary basis. Defendants in such cases are
entitled to be present at pretrial conferences, but may make written
waiver of such right.
2 13
The Report and the Handbook contain many recommended devices
for counsel and the judge to use in expediting the "big case." While the
Handbook is more comprehensive and more flexible than the Report, both
represent much thought and effort. Although many of their devices are
admirable, others seem more dubious despite their talented authorship.
Expediency may be had at too high a price. The Director of the Office
of the Administrator of the United States Courts has expressed doubts
that the federal courts have the manpower to carry out the recommenda-
tions in the Handbook. He has suggested that administrative assistants
be assigned to judges to perform ministerial tasks with respect to pro-
tracted cases.214
The tendency in antitrust matters to expedite at the expense of sub-
stance is not confined to the courts. In 1952, the hearing examiner for
the Federal Communications Commission began hearings to determine
the fitness of Paramount Pictures Company and United Paramount to
control television licenses and, with regard to the latter, to determine
whether a merger with the American Broadcasting Company should be
allowed." A major element within these issues was the antitrust history
of the applicants. After extensive hearings on such past history and at a
time when much evidence was largely completed, the applicants, upon a
plea of expedition and relying heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in
the Oregon Medical case, moved the Commission to have the hearings
terminated and to have all past antitrust history disregarded. Not only
was this motion granted over the opposition of the Commission's staff,
but the staff was not allowed to go into more recent antitrust history of
the applicants. This is expedition with a vengeance.
Another aspect of the Report and the Handbook is puzzling to this
writer. They, as shown by what has occurred in several antitrust cases,
seem to have shifted much of the time factor from the trial to the pretrial.
In some instances, pretrial proceedings of staggering proportions have
ensued. Days and weeks are spent discussing documents and arguing
213. HAND3001, pp. 46, 51; App. 63 ff. See Kaufman, The Apalachin Trial: Further
Observations on Pretrial in Crininal Cases, 44 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 53 (1960). See also
Seminar, 28 F.R.D. 78, 157 (1961).
214. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Sect. on Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Symposium,
1960 TRADE REG. REP.
215. In re Applications of Paramount Pictures, Inc., Nos. 10031-10034, 10046-10047,
10110, FCC 1951.
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objections to them. Mammoth briefs are written, pretrial as well as after
trial. Some judges apparently believe they have to come in contact with
all aspects of the documentary case of the parties before trial. Judges
take over the function of counsel, and when they bend under the burden,
they do such things as to demand of counsel specifications of a number
of "most important documents." They are called upon to make decision
after decision prior to the actual trial.216 In a number of instances, al-
leviation of the burden on the court is accompanied by an increase of the
burden on counsel.
Regardless of all that has been said, it is clear that pretrial devices
are generally worthwhile in the handling of a "big case." They often ex-
pedite the ultimate decision in a case, and pretrial orders of an extremely
wide scope are possible.21 However, pretrial is not and should not be a
substitute for trial; and a test for any device should be: "Does it advance
a just decision?"2 8
One of the most important devices for handling a big case is the use of
factual trial briefs after the trial. A primary function of such briefs is
to synthesize a large mass of documents and testimony into a pattern
which has coherence as a whole. Such a brief also marshalls the evidence
with respect to particular issues. Answering and reply briefs can and
should serve to greatly ease the burden of a judge by limiting the area of
dispute as to what the documents and testimony prove, and by relieving
him from the necessity of any minute examination of the record.1 ' It
may well be that the distillation process which takes place in the minds of
counsel who prepare such briefs may lead to the omission of a reference
to a number of documents introduced at the trial, but the few minutes
it takes to put such evidence into the record is more than made up by
the hours saved in not having had to discuss such documents prior to or
early in the trial.
The Report and the Handbook are guides to a virtuous goal. It is
submitted, however, that the goal is not worth the effort if the effort is
allowed to endanger much greater goals.22 It is hoped that the approach
216. Padorani v. Bruckhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 551 (2d Cir. 1961); Syracuse Broad-
casting Corp. v. Newhouse, TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) 70130 (2d Cir.
Oct 4, 1961).
217. E.g., United States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F. Supp. 451 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
218. For a pretrial foul-up, see Mitchell v. Johnson, 274 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1960);
Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1960).
219. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 188 Fed. 127, 129 (D.
Del. 1911); SEC v. Glass Marine Indus., 194 F. Supp. 879 (D. Del. 1961).
220. In Almance Indus., Inc. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 1961),
the court said:
Courts exist to serve the parties, and not to serve themselves, or to present a
record with respect to dispatch of business. Complaints heard as to the law's
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of the Report and the Handbook may be modified so as to reshape their
recommendations into a pattern wherein expedition may be encouraged
without sacrifice of substance.
delays arise because the delay has injured litigants, not the courts. For the court
to consider expedition for its own sake 'regardless' of the litigants is to emphasize
secondary considerations over primary.
Compare Judge Medina's statement: "As far as I am concerned that hurry, hurry
business is out." Medina, Judges as Leaders in Improving the Administration of Justice,
36 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 6, 12 (1952). See Nims, Some Comments on the Relation of Pretrial
to the Rules of Evidence, 5 VAND. L. REv. 581, 587-88 (1952) :
Perhaps the most serious error of bench and bar in the past many years has
been the attempt to make court procedure an exact science, to force litigants to
conform to rules rather than to use the rules to meet human needs; to put form
before substance; the system above the service it can render. We must have
rules but by this time we ought to use them more wisely and mercifully.
Also see dissenting opinion, Link v. Wabash R.R., 291 F.2d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1961).
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